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SUBJECTIVE DECISIONMAKING AND
UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Melissa Hart*
INTRODUCTION

The world has changed dramatically since 1964, when Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act was passed, and it became illegal to discriminate in hiring
and other employment decisions on the basis of race or gender.' Gone are
the days of "Whites Only" signs on the doors of offices unwilling to offer a
job to an African-American applicant. No longer do many employers tell
female applicants directly that they should stay home and have babies. But
discrimination is still pervasive, now more often in the form of stereotyping
or unconscious bias. As a consequence, for many women and minorities, the
removal of explicit barriers to opportunity has not resulted in truly equal
opportunity. Willie Thomas is just one example.
For more than 25 years, Willie Thomas worked for the Troy City, Alabama, school system. 2 He was a school administrator for 14 years, and was
assistant school superintendent for five of those years. He had a master's3
degree and had made significant progress towards obtaining his doctorate.
In 1996, Mr. Thomas was one of 18 applicants for the position of superintendent of the Troy City Schools. The Alabama Association of School
Boards deemed eight of the applicants qualified for the position. Of these
eight, three-including Mr. Thomas-were African-American. 5 The Association of School Boards selected interview candidates from this group by
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I am grateful to Emily Calhoun,
Richard Collins, Tristin Green, Martin Katz, Sarah Krakoff, Dayna Bowen Matthew, Viva Moffat, Pierre
Schlag, Jane Thompson, Kevin Traskos, Phil Weiser, and Mimi Wesson for their insights. Thanks to
Stacey Brangenberg, Mitra Pemberton and Liz Porter-Merrill for their research assistance, and to the
generosity of the University of Colorado's Vice Chancellor for Diversity and Equity, whose IMPART
grant helped to fund research for this piece.
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (2004) [hereinafter TitIeVII]. Title VnI also prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion, and other
federal laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of age and disabilities. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). Many of the same issues of unconscious discrimination arise in interpreting and applying these statutes. For purposes of this Article, I will focus my discussion on Title VI's
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race and gender.
2.
Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1305 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
3.
Id. at 1308.
4.
Id. at 1306.
5.
Id. at 1306 n.2.
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first having each Association member rank the applicants, then tallying total
scores for each. The four candidates with the highest total score in this subjective ranking process were interviewed. Neither Mr. Thomas nor the other
two African-American candidates made the list of interviewees. 6 The candidate selected for the position was a white male.7
Mr. Thomas brought suit against the Troy City Board of Education,
charging that the decision not to hire him as superintendent violated Title
VII. 8 In response to his claims, the defendant explained that its "main criterion for choosing a new superintendent was the ability to improve academics"; that the candidate selected had a more academically focused background than Mr. Thomas; that its candidate had more education than Mr.
Thomas; and that questions had been raised about Mr. Thomas' credit history during the application process. 9 Mr. Thomas responded to each of these
explanations, noting again his extensive administrative experience, pointing
out that when he completed his doctorate, he would have a more advanced
degree than the candidate selected had obtained, and asserting that the0 information the Board had received about his credit history was incorrect.
The district court granted the Troy City School Board's motion for
summary judgment. Specifically, the court determined that the reasons offered for the Board's decision were "honest" and that, because he had not
shown them to be false, Mr. Thomas had failed to provide evidence to allow
an inference of impermissible discrimination." Interestingly, while the court
felt constrained by law to grant the defendant's summary judgment motion
because of the honesty of the Board's proffered explanations, the judge was
clearly uncomfortable with the decision. Indeed, the opinion ends with an
extended reflection that the court's decision "does not necessarily mean that
no discrimination occurred in the selection process.' 2 The difficulty, in the
judge's view, was that "[tlhe judicial focus on the search for unconstitutional discriminatory animus obscures the fact that it is possible that the
board chose the individual it perceived to be the 'best' candidate and, yet
still, that Thomas was subjected to discrimination; the two are not mutually
exclusive."' 3 A decisionmaking process where the subjective judgments of
the selecting officials are the primary criteria is particularly at risk for this
type of discrimination. "Such subjective decision-making processes," explained the Thomas court, "are particularly susceptible to being influenced
not by overt bigotry and hatred, but rather by unexamined assumptions
about others that the decisionmaker may not even be aware of-hence the

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

id.
ld. at
Id. at
Id. at
id.at
Id. at
Id. at

13.

Id.

1306.
1305.
1307-08.
1308.
1309-10.
1309.
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difficulty of ferreting out discrimination as a motivating factor."' 14 Despite
this clearly expressed sense that discrimination may have played a role in
Mr. Thomas's case, the court felt constrained to grant the defendant's summary judgment motion because of its "either-or approach" to Title VII liability: either the Board's explanation was honest and the decision was not
discriminatory, or the decision was discriminatory and the Board's explanation could be shown to be false.
The either-or approach to discrimination finds a parallel in the scholarly
literature. In that arena, the key distinction is framed in terms of conscious
(and prohibited) discrimination versus unconscious (and unremedied) discrimination. Regardless of how one formulates this distinction, many scholars and courts agree that conscious racial or sexual animus is currently a
necessary element of a Title VII claim. A number of academics thus argue
that Title VII falls short of its goals and should be revised so that it will
explicitly cover instances of unconscious discrimination.15 In sharp distinction to these courts and commentators, I argue in this Article that Title VII
holds out more promise for remedying unconscious discrimination than has
previously been recognized. Specifically, I argue that the either-or reading
of Title VII that the Thomas court felt compelled to take (and that most
other courts take as well) is both legally unnecessary and inappropriate.
Second, the dichotomy between conscious and unconscious discrimination
is one that cannot be maintained in light of antidiscrimination law's basic
proof structures. Finally, in cases challenging employers' subjective decisionmaking processes, plaintiffs have undoubtedly been combating unconscious discrimination for quite some time.
In Part I, I argue that-independent of its legal merits-the either-or
approach does not accurately reflect the ways in which discrimination enters
into employment decisions. Contemporary sociological and psychological
research reveals that discriminatory biases and stereotypes are pervasive,
even among well-meaning people. In fact, recent studies have focused particular attention on the unconscious biases of people whose consciously
held beliefs are strongly egalitarian.
In Part H, I argue that the either-or framework applied by most courts to
individual claims of discrimination is by no means required-and in fact is
unwarranted-under Title VII. A close reading of the statute and the case14.
Id.
15.
See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understandingof Bias: On Devaluationand
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 752 (2001); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995) [hereinafter Content of our Categories];Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning
a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2014-15
(1995); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 901 (1993);
see also Rebecca Harmer White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in
Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495,498 n.22, 498-99 (2001) (observing that
"[i]ntent, as various commentators have correctly noted, is best understood not as animus but as a causation concept," but also that "in examining whether disparate treatment has occurred, lower courts con-

tinue to search for conscious intent").
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law reveals that the either-or framework is more a judicial invention than a
mandatory aspect of Title VII. Even if there would have been merit to the
either-or approach under the original statute, such a reading is no longer
permissible in light of the Civil Rights Act of 199116 and the Supreme
Court's 2003 decision in Desert Palace v. Costa.17 The 1991 amendments to
Title VII made clear that a plaintiff could prove a violation of the law when
more than one factor motivated the decision; in other words, a defendant
can have both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for taking a particular action. Thus, honesty about the nondiscriminatory reason for a defendant's
actions cannot alone preclude the existence of a discriminatory motivation.
In Desert Palace,the Supreme Court corrected the mistaken assumption of
many lower courts that this mixed motive approach was available only
when plaintiffs could provide direct evidence of a discriminatory motive.18 I
argue that the Desert Palace decision allows plaintiffs to challenge decisions where there is evidence to suggest that the employer honestly believed
it was relying on nondiscriminatory reasons, but other evidence points to
racial or gender bias in the process.
In Part II, I assess how this legal framework has been and should be
applied to claims alleging that an employer's decisionmaking processes are
excessively subjective. These claims are particularly likely to target less
conscious forms of discrimination because the potential for unconscious
stereotypes and biases to intrude into the evaluation process is greatest when
subjective judgments are involved. 9
Claims of excessive subjectivity in decisionmaking can arise in individual cases challenging a particular employment decision, or in class action
suits more broadly challenging an employer's policies and practices. I first
consider the law applied to suits brought by individual plaintiffs. Numerous
courts have concluded that evidence of subjective decisionmaking processes
may raise an inference of discrimination, particularly when combined with
other circumstantial evidence. However, problems of proof will always present barriers to the ability of some individual plaintiffs to successfully demonstrate discriminatory motivation, whether conscious or unconscious.
Thus, this Article additionally addresses the use of class action suits to attack unconscious bias as a pervasive social harm. Unfortunately, courts are
sharply divided over the appropriateness of certifying classes alleging excessively subjective decisionmaking. While some of the most famous employment discrimination class actions in recent years have been certified on
16.
17.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2004).
539 U.S. 90 (2003).

18.

Jd. at 1014)2.

19.

See Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Research in

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 1049, 1056 (1991); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as
Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1137-38 (1999) ('The potential for these types of cognitive mechanisms to
play a role would be greatest when assessments have an important subjective component--and espe-

cially where employers are making complex, multifactorial, discretionary judgments about ongoing
workplace performance.").
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precisely these grounds, many judges are extremely resistant to the notion
that an employer might have a generally applicable policy of excessive subjectivity.
I conclude that the existing Title VII framework provides significant potential for challenging unconscious discrimination. In both individual cases
and class litigation, plaintiffs have successfully challenged the use of the
unfettered discretion that most commonly permits cognitive biases to infect
decisionmaking. The very nature of these claims, however, often makes
them the "hard cases." This difficulty is compounded by the fact that, like
employers, judges are subject to cognitive biases and may be unable to see
beyond their own assumptions in evaluating the merits of a case.
I.

THE INFLUENCE OF UNCONSCIOUS BIAS ON EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS

There is little doubt that unconscious discrimination plays a significant
role in decisions about hiring, promoting, firing, and the other benefits and
tribulations of the workplace. As former Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich
put it: "subtle but pervasive patterns of discrimination dominate the public,
private and nonprofit sectors of society because of a 'myopia' on the part of
many white male managers who 'unthinkingly discriminate' without having
any idea they are doing so. ' ' 2° Extensive social psychological literature
documents the ways in which unconscious racism and sexism,21and the consequent stereotyping, operate in employment decisionmaking.
For the first half of the twentieth century, psychologists and social theorists viewed prejudice primarily as a psychopathology, "a dangerous aberration from normal thinking. 22 From this perspective, correcting prejudice
was a matter of identifying prejudiced people and punishing or changing
them. This view of prejudice did not leave room for the possibility that all,
or substantially all, people engage in unconscious discrimination and stereotyping. Title VII was enacted in the shadow of this approach, and early
caselaw interpreting the statute reflected a strong belief that an employer's
actions could be explained either as untainted business judgments or as conscious and intentional discrimination, and that the job of the courts was to
figure out which of the two was at play.
20.
Catherine S. Manegold, "Glass Ceiling" is Pervasive, Secretary of Labor Contends, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at B1, available at 1994 WL 2080277.
21.
This Article touches only briefly on the current research into unconscious discrimination. A
number of legal scholars have explored the topic in greater detail. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a StructuralAccount of DisparateTreatment Theory, 38 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95-99 (2003) [hereinafter Toward a Structural Account]; Gary Blasi, Advocacy
Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002); Ann
C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 415,421-26 (2000); Unda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika:Intergroup Relations
After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1258-76 (1998); Content of Our Categories,supra note
15, at 1186-1211; Oppenheimer, supra note 15, at 902-15.
22.
John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of ContemporaryPrejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES
829, 830 (2001), availableat http:llwww.blackwell-synergy.comlinkstdoiiv.iiiilOO22-4537.002441pdf.
23.
See, e.g., Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("[W]e presume these acts, if
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In the second half of the last century, social psychologists began to recognize that bias was the product of normal developmental processes.2 4 Research into the process of socialization and development of social norms led
to an understanding that the development of stereotypes-and consequent
biases and prejudices-is not a function of an aberrational mind, but instead
an outcome of "normal cognitive processes associated with simplifying and
storing information of overwhelming quantity and complexity that people
encounter daily. '' 25 Indeed, some amount of stereotyping-categorizing
things and people according to generalizations-is necessary to survival.26
Moreover, much stereotyping is the product not of explicit, consciously held
attitudes, but of implicit beliefs that are "automatically activated by the
that "commere presence (actual or symbolic) of the attitude object," 27 and
28
monly function in an unconscious and unintentional fashion.,
These unconscious attitudes affect our interactions, assumptions, and
expectations throughout the life of a relationship. Linda Hamilton Krieger's
excellent exploration of the development of stereotyping schemas explains
that "discrimination is not necessarily something that occurs 'at the moment
of decision."' 29 By focusing the legal inquiry on the employer's intent at the
moment an employment decision is made, the law fails to recognize that
discrimination "can intrude much earlier, as cognitive process-based errors
in perception and judgment subtly distort the ostensibly objective data set
upon which a decision is ultimately based." 3 By the time an employment
decision is made, the employer may quite firmly believe that a black employee's record is not as good as a white counterpart's-a belief formed
over time by the significance assigned, sometimes quite unconsciously, to
particular acts and omissions on the part of each employee. Indeed, the research on development of stereotypes demonstrates that even before having
any interaction with a particular individual, background assumptions will
influence how a decisionmaker perceives a job candidate. A white candidate
may be viewed as more charismatic, thoughtful, collegial, or articulate than
a black candidate, not because the white candidate in fact possesses those
higher qualifications,
but because of the decisionmaker's preexisting as31
sumptions.
otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors ....
And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from our experience that more often than
not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting."); see also Content of our Categories,supra note 15, at 1177.
24.
See Dovidio, supra note 22, at 831; Content of our Categories,supra note 15, at 1186-88.
25.
Dovidio, supra note 22, at 831.
26.
See, e.g., Content of our Categories, supra note 15, at 1163-64 (pointing out the ways that
parents teach their children to "stereotype" about potentially dangerous animals or interactions with
strangers in order to guide children to safe choices).
27.
John F. Dovidio et al., Why Can't We Just Get Along, Interpersonal Biases and Interracial
Distrust,8 CULTURAL DIVERSITy AND ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 88, 94 (2002).

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Content of our Categories,supra note 15, at 1121.
Id.
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence lI, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with

2005]

Unconscious Discrimination

Compounding the effects of these unconscious cognitive processes is
what researchers in the past decade have come to recognize as a pervasive

"conflict between the denial of personal prejudice and the underlying unconscious negative feelings and beliefs.

32

Recognition of this conflict runs

across a number of different models that attempt to explain contemporary
racism and sexism.33 These models share in common the conclusion that as

a consequence of this conflict, discrimination is most likely to occur in contexts where it can be justified as something other than discrimination. Stud-

ies of "aversive racism" are especially interesting and potentially problematic for employment discrimination law, as they focus on the unconscious
behavior of people for whom being unbiased is an important part of their
self-concept. Research done by proponents of the aversive racism framework demonstrates that "many people who explicitly support egalitarian
principles and believe themselves to be nonprejudiced also unconsciously
harbor negative feelings and beliefs about blacks and other historically disadvantaged groups. 34 These studies suggest that aversive racists will not
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-25 (1987). In his remarkable article, Lawrence ties
notions of unconscious discrimination to the broader shared American experience, noting the impact of
the
historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a dominant role.
Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs
that attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions
about nonwhites. To the extent that this belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racWe do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our
ists ....
beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions.
Id. at 322; see also Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities:Race, Retaliation, & the Promise of Title VII, 34
COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 529, 537 (2003) ("[M]odem culture feeds and reinforces black stereotypes
of incompetence, occupational instability, primitive morality, and similar derogatory perceptions.").
Numerous researchers have explored how assumptions about appropriate gender behavior can have
similar consequences for evaluation of male and female job applicants. See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman et
al., Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women Who Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 416, 416 (2004); Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using
Social Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 401, 405-12 (2003) (describing how gender stereotypes affect perceptions of women's "fit" with particular jobs); Alice 14. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory
ofPrejudiceToward Female Leaders, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 573, 576 (2002).
32.
Dovidio et al., supra note 27, at 90.
33.
The dominant explanatory theories for contemporary prejudice are called "modem," "symbolic," and "aversive" racism. See Janet K. Swim et al., Sexism and Racism: Old-Fashionedand Modern
Prejudices, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 199, 199 (1995). Because aversive racism has particular
relevance to employment discrimination, it is discussed in greater detail in the text. Theories of "modem" and "symbolic" racism are focused more on explaining public policy preferences than on individual
decisionmaking. These theories suggest that many whites feel considerable resentment towards black
Americans because of a perception that discrimination is a problem of the past, and a belief that black
Americans receive "special favors" despite the substantial elimination of past discrimination. See M.J.
Monteith & C.V. Spicer, Contents and Correlates of Whites' and Blacks' Racial Attitudes, 36 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 125, 127 (2000). However, these models suggest that because "Whites
are genuinely committed to the abstract principles of justice (i.e., equality, fairness, and freedom) ...
modem racists express negative attitudes towards Blacks that supposedly can be justified by invoking
nonprejudiced explanations." Id.
34.
John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and
1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 315 (2000); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological
Association in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, Nos. 02-241 & 02516, at p. 6 ("Thus, many people who firmly believe that they have open and favorable attitudes about

748
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discriminate in situations where the discrimination would be obvious, but

that "because aversive racists do possess negative feelings, often unconsciously, discrimination occurs when bias is not obvious or can be rational-

ized on the basis of some factor other than race. 35
In a particularly interesting study illustrating this point, researchers

simulated an interview process in which job candidates ranged along a spectrum from unqualified to very qualified and included both black and white
applicants. White participants were asked to select from among groups of
these job candidates. 36 The self-described "non-racist" study participants

made apparently unbiased choices when black candidates were either
plainly qualified or plainly unqualified. But when these participants were
presented with a marginally qualified black candidate, they gave that candi-

date significantly weaker recommendations than they gave a comparably

qualified white candidate.37 The study was conducted in 1989, and again in
1999. In both instances, the results were the same. The participants in the

1999 study were noticeably less direct in their verbal expression of racial
prejudice, but their actual selection behavior did not change. 38 This confirms
other research suggesting that "unconscious racism governs behavior among

white employers who would not consciously choose to discriminate against
African Americans. ' 3 9 This behavior can affect all aspects of an employment decision, but psychologists recognize in particular that "subjective
judgments of interpersonal skills and collegiality are quite vulnerable to

stereotypic biases." 4
The effect that unconscious stereotyping has on employment decisions

has not escaped judicial notice. Recall that Willie Thomas' judge noted that

"subjective decision-making processes are particularly susceptible to being

influenced not by overt bigotry and hatred, but rather by unexamined assumptions about others that the decisionmaker may not even be aware of.' 41

And, the First Circuit recently recognized that discrimination can occur "repeople of various races and ethnicities will demonstrate that they implicitly (unconsciously) harbor a
variety of racial and ethnic prejudices that can translate into subtle discriminatory behaviors.").
Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 34, at 315.
35.
Id. at 316-17.
36.
37.
Id. at 317.
Id.
38.
39.
Oppenheimer, supra note 15, at 902; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, "'RationalDiscrimination,"
Accommodation and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REv. 825, 850 (2003); Timothy
D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on
Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCH. BULL. 117, 121 (1994). Significant research about stereotyping
and bias regarding work and family issues and gender discrimination demonstrates how cultural assumptions inform and infect employment decisions along gender lines as well. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy
Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who are Discriminated Against On the
Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 77 (2003) (discussing how this operates for women who have recently
had children); Tracy Anbinder Baron, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The Courts' Failure
to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 267, 271 (1994); see also Gordon
Hodson et al., Processes in Racial Discrimination.'Differential Weighting of Conflict Information, 28
PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 460, 460 (2002) (noting that the research on aversive racism has
been extended to attitudes toward women).
40.
Fiske et al., supra note 19, at 1056.
41.
Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
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gardless of whether the employer consciously intended to base the evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias. 4 2
Often these moments of judicial recognition are overshadowed by a
more general approach to discrimination claims that regards employment
decisions as made either for solely legitimate or illegitimate reasons. As
current research recognizes, this view fails to capture how discrimination
actually infects evaluative judgments. Social psychology teaches us that
human decisionmaking is rarely, if ever, so binary. Indeed, it is precisely
when decisions can be justified on some other basis that decisionmakers
may be most likely to allow discriminatory impulses to creep into the process.
II. UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN CURRENT LAW:
CHALLENGING AND CHANGING THE BASIC FRAMEWORK

In McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,4 3 the Supreme Court asserted
that Title VII "tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." 44 This
claim no doubt overstates the reach and force of federal antidiscrimination
law as it actually operates. 45 It is true, however, that Title VII not only prohibits outright expressions of discriminatory intent, but also provides some
redress when unthinking discrimination infects employer decisionmaking.
This fact-that Title VII reaches unthinking discrimination-is often
misunderstood or discounted by both courts and scholars. In the courts, the
misunderstanding takes the form of a judicially created requirement of employer dishonesty in Title VII litigation. Among scholars, it has largely
emerged as a distinction drawn between "conscious" and "unconscious"
discrimination, with many reformers arguing that the law must be changed
to accommodate challenges to the latter. The unconscious or unthinking
"bias [that creeps] into everyday social interactions and judgments on the
job'" is described in the academic literature with terms including "stereo' 49
typing, 47 "subtle discrimination,"'" "second generation discrimination, '
42.

Thomas v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 183 F.3d 38,58 (1 st Cir. 1999).

43.

McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

44.
Id. at 801.
45.
See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 15, at 2014-15; MeGinley, supra note 21, at 455-58; Krieger &
White, supra note 15, at 495-99; Chamallas, supra note 15, at 752. Chamallas notes:
Although courts still frequently state that the law is designed to capture subtle as well as overt
forms of discrimination, a common complaint among feminist and critical race commentators

is that current legal doctrines are inadequate to handle contemporary manifestations of bias
against women, racial minorities, and other disfavored social groups.
Id.
46.
Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 659 (2003) [hereinafter Targeting Workplace Context].
See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a Barrier to Gen47.
der Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 1,4 (2003); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1267 (2000); David B. Oppenheimer, UnderstandingAffirmative Action, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 921,957 (1996).
48.
See, e.g., Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34

COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 529, 540-44 (2003) (giving examples of "subtle" discrimination); Michael
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Whichever of these terms is

used, the categorical distinction drawn between conscious or overt discrimination and subtle or unconscious discrimination assumes an unnecessary
limit on the reach of Title VII that is mirrored by the dishonesty requirement

imposed by many courts. One of my principal aims in this Article is to argue that this distinction must be abandoned. In making this argument, however, I am forced to choose a vocabulary that acknowledges the distinction
currently drawn. I therefore use the term "unconscious discrimination" to
refer to circumstances in which a decisionmaker is honestly unaware of the

extent to which race and gender play a role in an employment decision.
However, if it were possible to identify all of the judgments that went into
the challenged decision, the decisionmaker's assumptions and beliefs about
the race or gender of the applicant would prove to have played a motivating
part in the decision. I use the term "unconscious discrimination" rather than
a term like "subtle discrimination" because I want to capture explicitly the
idea that the discriminator's awareness of her motivations is not a necessary
element of a Title VII claim.

Assessing the law's response to discrimination, whether conscious or
not, requires some evaluation of both the doctrine and its operation. This
section focuses on doctrine and, in particular, on the standards for proving
what is called disparate treatment discrimination. In a disparate treatment
suit, a plaintiff alleges that a particular adverse employment action was
taken "because of" a protected characteristic. 5 1 Title VII also allows plaintiffs to bring so-called "disparate impact" claims, challenging facially neutral employer policies that have a disproportionate effect on members of a
protected class. 52 The great majority of employment discrimination suits in
Selmi, Discriminationas Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1237 (1999) ("The difficulty that arises from determining when behavior can be defined as unconscious in nature is one reason
why I now prefer to use the term 'subtle discrimination' to define discrimination that relies on circumstantial evidence for proof."); Flagg, supra note 15, at 2013 (describing subtle discrimination as white
transparency-the unconscious imposition of white norms, thought to be race-neutral or objective,
without regard to the subordinate position in which such norms place people of color).
49.
See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A StructuralApproach, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 458,460 (2001). Sturm states that
"[s]econd generation" claims involve social practices and patterns of interaction among
groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude nondoninant groups. Exclusion is frequently difficult to trace directly to intentional, discrete actions of particular actors, and may
sometimes be visible only in the aggregate. Structures of decisionmaking, opportunity, and
power fail to surface these patterns of exclusion, and themselves produce differential access
and opportunity.
id.
50.
See, e.g., Krieger & White, supra note 15, at 509; McGinley, supra note 21, at 426; Lawrence,
supra note 31, at 322; David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
CorporateLaw Firms?An InstitutionalAnalysis, 84 CAL. L. REv. 493, 509 (1996).
The relevant section of Title VII, Section 703(a), provides that
51.
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1973); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004). 1 will
52.
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federal courts, however, are brought by individual plaintiffs asserting disparate treatment claims.53
In this Part, I discuss the procedural framework that courts have long
used to evaluate disparate treatment discrimination claims, and I challenge
the assumption of employer dishonesty that courts have imported into that
framework. I then explain how the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court last year, eliminated any support for this misplaced
focus on dishonesty and should lead courts to a more realistic assessment of
discrimination claims. As I argue below, the current framework for evaluating employment discrimination law does in fact make space for recognition
of the complexity of human decisionmaking. What remains is for courts to
apply the law with this same recognition.
A. DisparateTreatment and the McDonnell-Douglas Framework
From the earliest days of Title VII litigation, courts have recognized
that proving that a prohibited factor motivated an employment decision is
not an easy task. 54 It is an exceedingly rare case in which a plaintiff has true
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such as a statement from the employer that "we don't hire Mexicans, so you can't have this job." Most Title
VII cases are therefore proved through circumstantial evidence. To support
her claim, a plaintiff may have evidence of disparaging remarks made by
her employer suggesting stereotypical views about particular racial minorities or women. Alternatively, the plaintiff may be able to demonstrate procedural irregularities or differential treatment that suggests the employer did
not give her the same chances it gave to other employees. 56 A plaintiff may
present evidence about the make-up of the employer's workforce that suggests an unwillingness to hire minorities or women or a tendency to segregate them into lower-status jobs.57 Or, a plaintiff s circumstantial case may
discuss disparate impact claims in Part IH.B.
53.
See, e.g., J. Piette & Douglas G. Sauer, Legal and Statistical Approaches to Analyzing Allegations of Employment Discrimination,3 J. LEGAL ECON. 1, 2-3 (1993) ("The vast majority (over 90%) of
all employment discrimination cases are filed on behalf of either a single plaintiff or group of multiple
plaintiffs. Only a small proportion are class action litigations."); Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights
Act of 1991: What Does It Mean and What Is Its Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 304, 314 (1992) ("By
and large, 'disparate impact' cases are fairly infrequent, as compared to cases alleging intentional discrimination.").
54.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 528 (1993) (recognizing that requiring direct
evidence of discriminatory intent would be imposing too great a burden on a plaintiff); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 670 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that direct evidence of discriminatory intent is difficult to establish and that discriminatory intent is more likely established by inference); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,358 n.44 (1977).
55.
See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (presenting strong evidence of
sex stereotyping); James 0. Castagnera & Edward S. Mazurek, Sex DiscriminationBased Upon Sexual
Stereotyping, 53 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 26 (2004).
56.
See, e.g., Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard, 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002).
57.
See, e.g., Simms v. Oklahoma, 165 F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999); Colon-Sanchez v. Marsh,
733 F.2d 78, 81 (10th Cir. 1984); Aracne v. Lucky Stores Inc., No. C81394RPA, 1983 WL 495, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 1983) (stating that the plaintiff provided evidence that the employer had not hired any
new women to work in his plant from 1974 to 1983).
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simply involve presenting evidence about the plaintiffs job qualifications,
motivated in not
and arguing that the employer must have been illegally
58

selecting him for the job, given those qualifications.
Whatever the evidence a plaintiff may offer in support of a claim, the

Supreme Court has articulated a framework for evaluating the evidence that
is both well-established and still evolving. 59 The framework, established in
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,60 is a three-step burden-shifting ap-

proach to the presentation of evidence. It does not create any particular standard for liability, but instead is a procedural device designed to help courts

focus the discussion in light of the difficult issues of proof that arise in
discrimination cases. 6' The McDonnell-Douglas framework has been the
subject of considerable judicial and academic criticism, 62 but it remains the

accepted approach to evaluating most claims of discrimination.
The first step in the McDonnell-Douglasframework requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff has the
burden to demonstrate that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
was qualified for the position she sought, or was successfully meeting the

requirements of her current position; (3) she applied for, and did not receive, the position or promotion; and (4) the position remained open or was
58.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Ins. Co. of North America, 49 F.3d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that
although the plaintiff was unsuccessful in his claim, he brought forth evidence that he was more qualified for the position than the person ultimately hired by the defendant); Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Service,
516 F. Supp. 810, 831 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (holding that the plaintiff brought forth evidence of many black
employees being turned down for promotions that less qualified and less experienced white employees
received).
59.
The "evolving" nature of a standard that has been applied for the past thirty years is a consequence of judicial and academic uncertainty over the relationship between the framework discussed here
and the standards set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In a 2003 decision, the Supreme Court laid to
rest the argument that disparate treatment law has two tracks: one for cases involving direct evidence,
and one for cases involving circumstantial evidence. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99
(2003). Courts and commentators are now struggling to integrate the 1991 law's "motivating factor"
standard with the traditional framework. For a more extended discussion of this point, see Part II.B.
60.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
61.
See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) ("In a Title VII
case, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie
case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination."); see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("[The McDonnellDouglas approach] was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a
sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination.").
See, e.g., Wells v. Colorado Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J.,
62.
writing separately) ("The McDonnell Douglas framework only creates confusion and distracts courts
from 'the ultimate question of discrimination velnon."') (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)); Higareda v. Ford Motor Co., No. 011182CVWHFS , 2003 WL
22110496, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2003) (observing that many cases over-emphasize the McDonnellDouglas analysis); Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified
Method for Assessing Evidence in DiscriminationCases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 659, 659 n.3 (1998);
Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703, 703-05 (1995) (criticizing all aspects of the three-part McDonnellDouglas framework); Hannah Arterian Fumish, FormalistSolutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme
Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 353, 372
(1984); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV.
2229, 2236 (1995) (arguing for the abandonment of the McDonnell-Douglasstructure).
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filled by someone else. 63 This serves the purpose of eliminating the most
obvious non-discriminatory reasons that an employment decision might
have been made-the glaintiff was not qualified, did not apply, or there was
no position available. By eliminating these possible explanations for the
adverse action, the plaintiff establishes a presumption that the action was
the product of discrimination.65
At this point, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. 66 The defendant's burden of production is quite minimal; all that is
necessary is to offer some response to the plaintiffs prima facie case. At
this stage, the defendant's proffered explanation does not need to be the
actual reason for the employment decision, or even a particularly plausible
reason.67 But the quality of the defendant's response will obviously have a
considerable impact on the outcome of the litigation.
After the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, and the employer
has responded with its reasons for the decision, the factfinder is presented
squarely with the question of whether the adverse action was taken "because
of' race or sex. At this point, "the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its
presumptions and burdens-disappear[s], and the sole remaining issue [i]s
discrimination., 68 Despite this purported "disappearance," the third stage of
the McDonnell-Douglasframework is where most of the action, and most of
the confusion, seems to be. What is clear at this point is that the plaintiff
bears the ultimate burden of convincing the factfinder that discrimination
was the reason-or at least a reason-for the employer's actions.69 Less
clear is what evidence the plaintiff can use to meet this burden.
It is a question with considerable procedural importance. The McDonnell-Douglas framework is intended to help courts evaluate whether a claim
of discrimination should go to trial. Nearly every court of appeals in the
country has concluded that the technicalities of the burden-shifting framework should not be presented to the jury.70 Similarly, when appellate courts
63.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6; McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Some courts have described
this fourth element as requiring the plaintiff to show that she "was rejected under circumstances giving
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Obi v. Anne Arundel County, 142 F. Supp. 2d 655, 662
(D. Md. 2001). These elements will obviously shift slightly under the particular facts of a given case. If a
plaintiff is challenging a firing, for example, the third element would require proof that she was fired.

64.
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54; Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978);
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 & n.44 (1977).
65.
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. Because this presumption is established, the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment if the defendant says nothing in response to the plaintiff's prima facie case. Id.

66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 254-55; see also Chin & Golinsky, supra note 62, at 665 (noting that the defendant's

burden at this stage is so light that "there is not a single reported case in which a plaintiff prevails at the

second step in a discrimination lawsuit because a defendant employer is unwilling or unable to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.").
68.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000) (citation and internal

quotation omitted).
69.
See id. at 143; Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,99-100 (2003).
70.
See, e.g., Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL Ltd.), 214 F.3d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We agree that juries
should not be charged on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework."); Gordon v. New York
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review a judgment after a trial on the merits (as opposed to after summary
judgment), they look not at the three-part structure, but at the evidence in
the record as a whole. 7' For the plaintiff, getting past this third stage of the

burden-shifting framework therefore means surviving summary judgment
and getting to a jury. Both plaintiffs and defendants seem to hold the view

quite strongly that a plaintiff who can get to a jury in a discrimination case
a case
is likely to win. That perception, whether accurate or not, means that
72
settle.
that makes it past summary judgment is much more likely to
The procedural significance of the third stage in the burden-shifting
process makes the question of the kind of evidence needed to satisfy the
plaintiffs burden extremely important. In McDonnell-Douglas, the Supreme Court described this step in the framework for presentation of evidence as the "pretext" stage, and noted that a plaintiff must be "given a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the pre-

sumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision., 73 The Court has used language in other
cases suggesting that the plaintiffs burden is to prove both that the defendant lied in describing the reasons behind a decision and that the decision
was the product of discrimination.74 Unfortunately, many lower courts have
interpreted this to mean a plaintiff is required to show dishonesty on the part

City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The jury... does not need to be lectured on the
concepts that guide a judge in determining whether a case should go to the jury."); Pivirotto v. Innovation Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 347 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that jury instructions should not include the
technical aspects of McDonnell-Douglas); Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co. Inc., 853 F.2d
1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that burden-shifting instructions "are beyond the function and expertise of the jury, which need never hear the term 'primafacie case."'); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952
F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Instructing the jury on the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions,
and the shifting burden of proof is unnecessary and confusing."); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340,
343 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the trial judge acted correctly in declining "to walk the jury through the
paradigm established by McDonnell Douglas"); Williams v. Valentec Kisko, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 731
(8th Cir. 1992) (reiterating that "the McDonnell Douglas ritual is not well suited as a detailed instruction
to the jury") (citation and internal quotation omitted); Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ("[I]t is not normally appropriate to introduce the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework to the jury."), aft'd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903
F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The McDonnell Douglas inferences provide assistance to a judge as
he addresses motions to dismiss, for summary judgment, and for directed verdict, but they are of little
relevance to the jury."); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) ("We
stress that it is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis.").
See, e.g., Hall v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 298 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002). Cf. United Stares
71.
Postal Service Boardof Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1983) ("Because this case was fully
tried on the merits, it is surprising to find the parties and the Court of Appeals still addressing the question whether Aikens made out a prima facie case. We think that by framing the issue in these terms, they
have unnecessarily evaded the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.").
See, e.g., Robert E. Talbot, A PracticalGuide to Representing Parties in EEOC Mediation, 37
72.
U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 671 (2003); Laurence H. Reece Il, Valuation and Settlement of Employment Disputes, in WINNING THROUGH SETrLEMENT § 7.4.5 (Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., ed. 2001).
411 U.S. at 805 (emphasis added).
73.
See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-11 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253
74.
("[P]laintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.").
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of an employer in75order to meet the burden at the third stage of the McDonnell-Douglastest.
However, evidence of employer dishonesty is not required by Title VII
itself. The statute requires only that a plaintiff demonstrate that her employer's decision was taken "because of race, sex or some other prohibited
characteristic. 76 In spite of using some language suggesting that dishonesty
is an element of a discrimination claim, the Supreme Court has never held
that evidence of mendacity is the only form of proof available to a Title VII
plaintiff. In fact, in one of its more recent opinions construing Title VII, the
Court noted that evidence suggesting a defendant's explanation for an employment practice is "unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination. '7 As the
Court recognized, a plaintiff does not have to prove that her employer lied
in order to raise a reasonable inference that discrimination played a role in
the decision.7 8
75.
The most extreme articulation of this view comes from the Seventh Circuit. In Millbrook v. JBP,
Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002), the court stated:
Pretext means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action. The question is not whether
the employer properly evaluated the competing applicants, but whether the employer's reason
for choosing one candidate over the other was honest. "Pretext for discrimination" means
more than an unusual act; it means something worse than a business error; "pretext" means
deceit used to cover one's tracks.
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1005
(7th Cir. 2001); Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000); Jordan v.
Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 2000); Brill
v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1273 (7th Cir. 1997);
Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995). This standard appears to have been used
only by courts in the Seventh Circuit, with two exceptions. See Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244
F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting a Seventh Circuit case); Garcia-Cabrera v. Cohen, 81 F. Supp.
2d 1272, 1281 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (quoting a Seventh Circuit case), affd, 237 F.3d 636 (1 lthCir. 2000).
Other courts, while using less extreme language, nonetheless refer tothe plaintiff's burden of proving
that the employer's proffered reason was not its true reason. See, e.g., Chambers v. Walt Disney World
Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1365 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (defining pretext as "a false or weak reason or
motive advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or motive") (citations omitted); Gray v. Univ. of
Arkansas, 658 F. Supp. 709, 723 (W.D. Ark. 1987) ("Pretext doesn't simply mean that the reasons given
are wrong or false. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines 'pretext' as 'a purpose or motive alleged or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real intention or state of affairs."'), aftid, 883 F.2d
1394 (8th Cir. 1989); Turner v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) (asserting that the Court, in McDonnell-Douglas, intended pretext to mean "the use, by employers, of legitimate reasons for action to hide racial animus in decision making.").
76.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
77.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (emphasis added).
78.
Given the serious consequences of the focus on dishonesty, it is surprising that it has received
relatively little judicial or academic attention. During the 1990s, the "pretext" stage of the burdenshifting framework was the topic of significant debate, but the question was not whether proof of dishonesty was required, but whether both proof of dishonesty and some other evidence of discrimination
should be required. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 62, at 2305-11; see also William R. Corbett, The
"Fall" of Summers, theRise of "Pretext Plus," and the EscalatingSubordination of Federal Employment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV.
305 (1996); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus'"Rule in Employment DiscriminationCases, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 57 (1991); Ruth Gana Okediji,
Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimination in a Post-Hicks Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49
(1998). Some courts had read language in the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v.Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), as suggesting that a plaintiff could not get to a jury if she had only her
prima facie case plus evidence of employer dishonesty. These courts, adopting a "pretext-plus" approach, concluded that a plaintiff would have to also have some additional evidence to suggest discrimi-
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Examining the kinds of evidence that successful plaintiffs regularly use
to support their cases, it is clear that despite the language of dishonesty that
some courts employ, many allow plaintiffs to survive summary judgment
without actual proof of mendacity. Of course, a plaintiff can meet his "pretext" burden by exposing "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons," 79 but a plaintiff can also rebut a defendant's proffered explanation by
providing evidence of "prior treatment of plaintiff; the employer's policy
and practice regarding minority employment (including statistical data);
'8 °
disturbing procedural irregularities ...

and the use of subjective criteria.

Evidence of this sort may call the employer's explanation for the decision
into question, or suggest that it is not the only reason for the decision, but it
does not necessarily prove that the explanation was a lie. An employer's
explanation may be entirely honest in the sense that the employer felt she
was making a neutral, unbiased decision for particular reasons, but the
plaintiff may be able to point to circumstances surrounding the decision that
call into question the employer's own "honest" understanding of her reasons
for the decision. When a court concludes that a plaintiff has proved that her
employer was dishonest, it is simply assuming that an explanation, once
called into question by the circumstances surrounding the decision, was a
lie.
Courts requiring a showing of dishonesty necessarily suggest that a discriminating employer acted with a consciously formed intent to discriminate. Only an employer who knew she had acted for impermissible reasons-a conscious discriminator-would seek pretextual or dishonest explanations for her conduct. An employer who had acted with unconscious
bias would have no motivation to cover up her reasons for acting. The employer found liable thus becomes, as a legal matter, both a discriminator and
a liar. The assumption that employers who discriminate must be doing so
with conscious intent has a number of negative consequences. As Linda
Hamilton Krieger has argued, this assumption makes a "villain" out of any

nation. See, e.g., Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Fisher
v. Vassar C., 114 F.3d 1332, 1137 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998); Rhodes
v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676, 680 (4th

Cir. 1995); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 1994). Other courts concluded
that the plaintiff's prima facie case plus evidence of employer dishonesty would be enough to get to a
jury. See, e.g., Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 1997); Combs v. Plantation
Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045 (1998); Sheridan v. E.I.

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1129
(1997); Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 946 (1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healtheare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1994); Washington
v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1429 (9th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court ended the debate, adopting the latter
rule, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-49 (2000). In all the debate about

"pretext" versus "pretext-plus," very little notice was paid to the requirement of "pretext."
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
79.
Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Simms v. Okla80.
homa, 165 F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999)).

20051

Unconscious Discrimination

decisionmaker found liable for discrimination. 8' The stigma attached to being a "discriminator" is such that a decisionmaker will tend to aggressively
defend her innocence, and will be unlikely to be open to the possibility that
unconscious discrimination had a motivating role in the decision.82 These
serious implications of a finding of liability may also make judges more
hesitant to rule in favor of a plaintiff. And, the linguistic focus on employer
dishonesty gives the appearance83that Title VII does not provide any remedy
for unconscious discrimination.
But, just as proof of mendacity is not a requirement of Title VII, proof
of conscious intent to discriminate is not a requirement either. 84 When
courts assert that a successful plaintiff has proven discriminatory intent,
what they mean is that, in the absence of another explanation, given the
weight of the circumstantial evidence, they are inferring that the employer
acted with bad intent. 85 The widely accepted legal fiction in such cases is
that while there may be little external evidence of discriminatory attitude or
motivation in a supervisor's actions, if there were a way to discover what
that supervisor actually was thinking, we would learn that his or her impulses were overtly racist or sexist. 86 Given that most cases are proved by
81.
Content of our Categories, supra note 15, at 1180-81. Describing her work as a plaintiffs attorney, Kreiger explains that
pretext theory not only permitted, but indeed compelled me to argue that the plant manager's
stated reasons were a "sham," a post hoc fabrication to cover up intentional discrimination. It
would not suffice to urge that the employer was a well-intentioned " good person" who,
through lack of care, did a " bad thing." The pretext story boards required me to paint him as
an intentional wrongdoer who was lying to the court.
Id. (citation omitted).
82.
See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 31, at 325-26. According to Lawrence:
Understanding the cultural source of our racism obviates the need for fault, as traditionally
conceived, without denying our collective responsibility for racism's eradication. We cannot
be individually blamed for unconsciously harboring attitudes that are inescapable in a culture
permeated with racism. And without the necessity for blame, our resistance to accepting the
need and responsibility for remedy will be lessened.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to Remedy Civil Rights Violations When
the Defendant is Not an Intentional Perpetrator: The Problems of Unconscious Disparate Treatment and
Unjustified Disparate Impacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 225, 234-35 (2003).
83.
Some commentators have asserted as much. See, e.g., Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and
Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege,
74 WASH.L. REv. 913, 926 (1999) (asserting that Title VII "omit[s] any recognition of unconscious
bias" and "require[s] proof of conscious, discriminatory intent to state a claim and obtain relief for
employment discrimination.") (citation omitted).
84.
See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric,
86 GEo.L.J. 279, 289 (1997). Selmi states:
What the Court means by intent is that an individual or group was treated differently because
of race. Accordingly, a better approach is to concentrate on the factual question of differential
treatment. In this way, the key question is whether race made a difference in the decisionmaking process, a question that targets causation, rather than subjective mental states.
Id.; see also Chamallas, supra note 15, at 753 (noting that "the meaning of intent has always been contested, particularly in Title VII cases.").
85.
See, e.g., Krieger & White, supra note 15, at 498 & n.22 (citing with approval a number of
scholars who have argued that "intent" in the Title VII context is actually a causation concept).
86.
The best-known articulation of this idea is Justice Brennan's statement in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989):
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if
we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we re-
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circumstantial evidence, however, there is no necessary legal difference
between discrimination that a decisionmaker is truly unaware of, and discriminatory attitudes that the decisionmaker simply never expresses out
loud. Indeed-absent a dramatic courtroom confession-it is unlikely that a
court will ever truly know which is at play.
B. The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Decision in Costa
In addition to importing a misplaced dishonesty requirement into Title
VII, courts applying the McDonnell-Douglasframework mistakenly assume
that employment decisions are motivated by a single factor-either honest
business judgment or dishonest discriminatory motivation. This idea is out
of step with the reality of human cognitive processes.87 Even without the
insights of social psychology, most of us would acknowledge that when we
make decisions, a variety of factors contribute to the process. Psychological
research supports that common sense view, and recent research on aversive
racism demonstrates that race may play a role in an employment decision
especially when some other explanation can be offered to justify the decision. 88 Thus, employment decisions are not either-or events, but events with
multiple motivations.
Whether intended or not, Congress and the Supreme Court have provided the doctrinal tools needed to bring legal evaluation of discrimination
claims more in line with the realities of discrimination. Title VII, as modified by Congress in 1991, recognizes that employment decisions may be89
motivated both by impermissible bias and and also by legitimate factors.
Unfortunately, for more than a decade following the enactment of the 1991
law, lower courts applied its "mixed motive" provision to only a small
handful of cases. The reluctance to recognize plaintiffs' claims that employer decisions had multiple motivating factors was the consequence of a
judicially imposed requirement that a plaintiff present "direct evidence" of
discrimination in order to argue that an employer with a legitimate explanation for its actions was also motivated by prejudice or bias. In Desert Palace
Inc. v. Costa,90 the Supreme Court laid to rest the direct evidence requirement, making it clear that Title VII claims can always be (and most often
will be) proven by circumstantial evidence. In so doing, the Court opened
the way for any plaintiff to argue that race or gender was one, even if not
the only, factor in an adverse employment action.

ceived a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was
a woman.

Id.
87.

See supra Part I.

88.
89.

See supra Part I.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).

90.

539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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1. Mixed Motives Analysis and the "Motivating Factor" Standard

In 1991, Congress enacted amendments to the Civil Rights Act in response to a series of 1989 Supreme Court decisions. Among these decisions
was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,9" in which the Supreme Court had for the

first time recognized a "mixed motive" claim under Title VII. 92 The Price
Waterhouse Court held that if a plaintiff shows that race or gender is one of
several factors motivating a decision, she may have a legitimate claim of
discrimination. However, if the employer could demonstrate that it would
have made the same decision without considering the impermissible factor,
this would be a complete
93 affirmative defense and the employer would not
have violated Title VII.
The mixed motive claim thus defined was, at best, a mixed blessing for

plaintiffs. On the one hand, it went a step toward eliminating the notion that
an employee has been discriminated against only if race or gender was the
exclusive motivator for the decision. On the other hand, an employer could

use discriminatory factors in the decisionmaking process but still avoid any
liability if it could show that it would have made the same decision anyway.

Imposing a further limitation on the potential for mixed motive claims, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurred separately to opine that a mixed motive claim should be available only when a plaintiff has "direct evidence" of
discrimination.94 In subsequent years, many courts and commentators took
Justice O'Connor's concurring view as the holding of the Court because her
vote had been necessary to obtain a majority, and could therefore be read as
necessary to the opinion. 95 Thus, the Price Waterhouse mixed motive claim
was not only limited by an exceedingly generous affirmative defense, but

of plaintiffs who might have
also was available only to the small number
96
direct evidence to support their claims.
Responding to the decision, Congress enacted two provisions in the

Civil Rights Act of 1991. The first relevant provision, section 703(m), pro91.
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (stating Congress's goal "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant
civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination"); see also Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (noting that the Civil Rights Act was enacted in response to
a number of court cases, including Price Waterhouse); Michael M. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform
Structure of Disparate Treatment DiscriminationLitigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 584 (1996).
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
92.
93.
Id. at 244-45.
94.
Id. at 276 (holding that the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have reached the
same decision only where "a disparate treatment plaintiff [can] show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision") (emphasis added).
95.
See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Despite the inarguable fact that onlyfour justices in Price Waterhouse would have imposed a 'direct evidence' requirement
for 'mixed-motives' cases, most circuits have engrafted this requirement into caselaw."), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 826 (1992). See generally Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case. .. 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds .... ' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
96.
See Zimmer, supra note 91, at 582-83.
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vides that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice." 97 The second provision, section 706(g),
creates an affirmative defense that does not eliminate liability, but potentially limits the employer's damages. Specifically, if the employer demonstrates that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor," the court "shall not award damages or issue
an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment." 98 Even if the affirmative defense is shown, however, the court may
award declaratory and injunctive relief and "attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m)." 99
With these changes, the legislature repudiated the Price Waterhouse
view that illegal discrimination has not occurred if the same action would
have been taken absent the discrimination. Instead, Congress clarified that,
even if other factors motivate a decision, when prohibited discrimination
forms any part of the decision, the law has been violated. However, employers who can show that they would have made the same employment
decision in the absence of the improper motive will face significantly
smaller financial penalties.
These amendments explicitly incorporate into the Title VII framework
the reality that decisions are generally made for more than one reason. The
statute requires a plaintiff to prove that an adverse action was taken "because of' a prohibited characteristic, and explains that an action is taken
because of a prohibited characteristic when that characteristic was "a motivating factor" in the decision. 100 Courts evaluating a plaintiff's disparate
treatment claims at summary judgment should no longer require that the
plaintiff demonstrate a single, illegal explanation for an adverse employment action. Instead, if a plaintiff provides sufficient evidence to suggest
that race or gender bias contributed to the decision, the plaintiff has met her
burden, even if the court also believes the "truth" of the employer's proffered reason.
Reading Title VII to incorporate mixed motives directly into the definition of what it means to discriminate "because of' race or gender makes the
statute more consistent with current sociological and psychological understandings of how discrimination works. As discussed in Part 1, most of the
significant psychological models for racism today suggest that discrimination most often occurs when the decisionmaker can justify the decision in
some other way. 01' Well-meaning study participants, confronted with a
97.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).

98.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

99.
100.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), -2(m).

101.

See supra Part I.
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black candidate and a white candidate in a simulated job selection process,
did not discriminate when the candidates' qualifications were unambiguous.10 2 Race became a factor in the decisions when the qualifications of the
candidates were marginal and the nonselection of the black candidate could
therefore be justified by the study participant as based on a factor other than
race.10 3 This suggests that race is less likely to be the exclusive motivator
for a decision than it is to be one among a number of motivating factors. By
allowing a plaintiff to show that a decision, while potentially justifiable on
other grounds, was also motivated by race, the statute is more consistent
with real experience than if it presents a "truth versus lies" vision of discriminatory motivation.
This mixed motive approach to discrimination also has what may be a
benefit of creating a class of cases in which, although discriminatory motivation is acknowledged as a violation, the defendant faces minimal damages. Because of the interaction among the various relevant provisions of
Title VH, a discrimination suit has a number of possible outcomes. A plaintiff could demonstrate that race or gender motivated the employment decision, and there could be no believable evidence that anything else truly motivated the decision. This is the traditional successful disparate treatment
claim. A plaintiff could demonstrate that race or gender was a motivating
factor, and the evidence could also suggest that other factors did motivate
the decision. Liability attaches, but the question of damages remains to be
resolved. If the defendant is unable to meet its burden of convincing the
factfinder that it would have made the same decision absent consideration of
the impermissible factor, then the plaintiff is entitled to the same damages
1°4
she would be entitled to in the traditional disparate treatment context.
But, the defendant may persuade the factfinder that it would have taken the
same action even absent the impermissible factor. In10 5that case, the defendant
will not be required to pay damages to the plaintiff.
This structure, in effect, recognizes two different levels of culpability
for what might be described as two different kinds of discrimination. In
cases where discrimination seems to have caused both the economic harm
of lost opportunity and the expressive harms that flow from discrimination
independent of the lost opportunity, a defendant will be liable to the plaintiff
for damages. In cases where the defendant can show that the tangible harm
suffered by the plaintiff would have happened even absent the expressive
harm of discrimination, the defendant will not have to compensate the plaintiff for that lost opportunity. Neither, however, will the law pretend that no
harm was done at all. This structure is by no means a perfect method for

102.

See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 34, at 316-17.

103.

See id.

104.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (creating an affirmative defense); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)
(setting forth the damages available for a violation of Title VII).
105.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii). The defendant may face responsibility for attorney's fees
as well as declaratory and injunctive relief 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).

Alabama Law Review

762

[Vol. 56:3:741

recognizing different levels of culpability, 10 6 but it may further aid efforts to
challenge unconscious discrimination by creating a middle ground that will
make courts comfortable with acknowledging the role that discrimination
can play even in cases where employers can otherwise justify their decisions. And, by eliminating any argument that a finding of discrimination
requires the conclusion that the employer is a liar, it reduces some of the
"moral opprobrium" from a finding of Title VII liability in certain circum7
10

stances.

2. IncorporatingMixed Motives into McDonnell-Douglas
Reading Title VII, as amended in 1991, to incorporate the "motivating
factor" standard into all claims of discrimination under the statute should
hardly be controversial. The language of the statute is quite clear.') 8 Section
703(a) provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an9
employer .. .to discriminate . . . because of' a protected characteristic.'
Section 703(m) states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this [title], an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates [that a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for
any employment practice. ' 10Section 703(m) thus purports to establish a
general rule, subject only to explicit exceptions, of proof of "an unlawful
employment practice." Since section 703(a) also defines "an unlawful employment practice" and includes no explicit exception from the general rule
of section 703(m), there is no reason to imagine that they are mutually exclusive provisions."l
VII: Making Sense of Causation
106.
See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title
in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO L. J.(forthcoming 2005).
Unpacking Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 57-63 (Dec. 28, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Alabama Law Review) (arguing that the 703/706(g) interaction risks a windfall to defendants and may lead to under-enforcement because plaintiffs will be reluctant to pursue claims in which
they face the possibility of no damages).
Content of Our Categories, supra note 15, at 1244. Krieger has suggested a more explicit divi107.
sion between conscious and unconscious discrimination, in which what she describes as "moral opprobrium" may be limited in cases of unconscious discrimination by making the damages available for
unconscious cognitive bias track the damages available for disparate impact discrimination. Id. at 124344.
108.
See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 101-03 (2004) (arguing that mixed motive and pretext cases
should be treated similarly); Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell-Douglas
Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 983, 1008 (1999) ("Thus, from the plain language of the Act, it appears that sections 703(m) and
706(g)(2) of the amended Civil Rights Act were intended to apply to all Title V11 disparate treatment
claims."); Benjamin C. Mizer, Toward a Motivating Factor Test for Individual Disparate Treatment
Claims, 100 MIcH. L. REV. 234, 242 (2001); Zimmer, supra, note 91 at 600 ("Whenever the issue is
whether a Title VII-protected characteristic motivated the employer in taking the action challenged by
the plaintiff, the burden-shifting approach of sections 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) is appropriate.").
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
109.
110.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
The damages-limiting affirmative defense created in Section 706(g) provides the only textual
111.
argument against reading 703(a) and 703(m) together. 706(g) refers to "prov[ing] a violation under
section [703]m" and provides for attorney's fees "demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the
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And yet, even in the face of the statute's plain language, courts considering the application of the 1991 Civil Rights Act for over a decade have
declined to apply the "motivating factor" standard to all but a handful of
cases. These courts restricted application of the new standard because they
grafted the direct evidence requirement from Justice O'Connor's Price
Waterhouse concurrence onto the statutory analysis. 1 2 Under the resulting
two-track approach to employment discrimination claims, cases were designated either "mixed motive" or "pretext." Only those plaintiffs with admittedly hard-to-obtain direct evidence could argue that discrimination was one
factor, even if not the only factor, motivating an employment decision. The
vast majority of plaintiffs, proving their cases with circumstantial evidence,
were forced through the traditional
McDonnell-Douglasframework, with its
13
judicial emphasis on pretext.!

A unanimous Supreme Court rejected this direct evidence requirement
in Desert Palace v. Costa, noting that the plain language of 703(m) and its

absence of any special evidentiary burden on the plaintiff can only be read
to mean that a plaintiff can demonstrate mixed motives through either circumstantial or direct evidence.

4

The Court began its analysis of the Civil

Rights Act by observing that the statutory text provides that a plaintiff must
"demonstrate" that race or gender was a motivating factor in the decision,
but does not offer any suggestion of a "heightened showing through direct
evidence." ' 1 5 Furthermore, the Court observed, Congress defined the term
"demonstrate" at another point in the statute, explaining that it requires
meeting the "burdens of production and persuasion." ' 1 6 If Congress had

meant to include a heightened standard for the plaintiff, it could have done
so.117 Given the parallel use of the term "demonstrate" in the affirmative
pursuit of a claim under section 1703](m)." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(B)(i). These references could be read
to suggest that a claim under 703(m) is independent of a claim under 703(a). A better way to understand
the references, however, would be as distinguishing claims that an action was taken "because of' or
motivated in any part by race or gender from claims for retaliation, which is also prohibited by Title VII,
but for which the statute does not recognize the possibility of a mixed motive claim. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3 (explaining retaliation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (not including retaliation in the list of prohibited factors covered by the provision); see also Peterson v. Scott County, Civ. No. 02-4737 (RHK/AIB),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9579, at *31 (D. Minn. May 27, 2004) (discussing the relationship between
mixed motive and retaliation claims).
112.
See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2002); Fernandes v. Costa Bros.
Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999); Trotter v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 91 F.3d
1449, 1453-54 (11 th Cir. 1996); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (4th Cir. 1995).
113.
See Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment DiscriminationLaw Revisited: A Brief
Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV.651, 661-62 (2000) (describing conflict in the courts
over whether Section 703(m) applies only in direct evidence cases); cf Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875
F.2d 468, 481 (5th Cir. 1989). The Waltman court applied Price Waterhouse and noted that
[ilna mixed motive case, an employer may have legitimate and discriminatory reasons for
taking action injurious to a plaintiff. In a pretext case, an employer has either a discriminatory
or a non-discriminatory rationale for its actions. The elements the parties
must prove depend
upon the classification of the claim as a mixed motive case or a pretext case.
Id.
114.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003).
115.
Id. at 98-99.
116.
Id. at99 (citation omitted).
117.
Id. The Court notes that this is particularly clear given that Congress has provided heightened
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defense provision allowing a defendant to limit damages by "demonstrat[ing]" that it would have taken the same action, the Court observed that
it would be particularly odd to impose-without mentioning it-a different
proof standard in the two provisions. 1 8 Finally, the Court emphasized that
circumstantial evidence is a staple of civil litigation, and that judges should
to eliminate use of such evidence absent a
not assume that Congress meant
119
clear statement to that effect.
In spite of its unanimity and relative clarity, the Costa opinion still
managed to create some uncertainty. In a footnote that one court has described as "a strategically placed fig leaf designed to obscure the otherwise
clear implications of Desert Palace's reading"'120 of the statute, the Court
observed that "[t]his case does not require us to decide when, if ever, [the
motivating factor provision] applies outside of the mixed-motive context." ' 21 The Court thus purported to leave open the possibility that the motivating factor standard would not apply in some cases.
Despite this footnote, it is hard to imagine when the motivating factor
approach would not be available to a plaintiff. In most (if not all) discrimination cases, a plaintiff will start by asserting simply that the defendant
acted with a discriminatory motive. The defendant will respond that it did
not have a discriminatory motive, and that in fact the reasons for its decision
are entirely legitimate. In many (perhaps most) cases, there will be some
evidence to support both claims. There is no logical way to separate cases
involving mixed motives from cases in which a plaintiff claims that only a
single, illegitimate factor motivated the decision without imposing obligations not contemplated by the statute or basic rules of civil procedure. While
a plaintiff could, in theory, be required to choose at some early point in the
litigation whether she was planning to allege a single motive or mixed motives, this requirement is not contained in the statute. It could be done only
as a judicially imposed obligation without any textual support. Moreover,
any such requirement would be contrary to the general rule that a plaintiff in
federal court may plead any number of different theories for relief. 122 Thus,
even if a court were to view mixed motive and single motive discrimination
as two different kinds of claims, there would be no basis for forcing a plaintiff to choose between them.
In the year since Costa was decided, a few courts have retained a twotrack structure for considering Title VII claims. 23 In some respects, these
proof requirements in other parts of Title VII. Id. at 98-99.
118.
Id. at 101. The Court observed that "[aibsent some congressional indication to the contrary, we
decline to give the same term in the same Act a different meaning depending on whether the rights of the
plaintiff or the defendant are at issue." Id.
Id. at 100.
119.
Carey v. Fedex Ground Packaging Sys., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 902, 915 (S.D. Ohio 2004); see
120.
also Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d. 1180, 1196 n.l (N.D. IA 2003).
Costa, 539 U.S. at 94 n.l.
121.
122.
See FED. R. Civ. PRo. 8(a) ("Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.").
See, e.g., Louis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 303 F. Supp. 2d 799, 803 (M.D. La. 2003);
123.
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decisions seem to ignore the Costa holding entirely. One court, for example,
while acknowledging that it could no longer require direct evidence in order
to apply the motivating factor standard, framed the question instead as
whether the plaintiff had strong enough circumstantial evidence "to proceed
with the direct method of proof."' 24 The difference between the requirement
of direct evidence and the requirement of strong enough circumstantial evidence to apply a "direct method of proof' is not immediately apparent. And,
just as the former finds no support in the statute, the latter is also entirely
without textual basis.
The principal justification that courts offer for retaining this bifurcation
is that the McDonnell-Douglas framework does not recognize mixed motives. 2 5 This argument is based on a cramped and overly formalistic view of
McDonnell-Douglas, and it presents the problematic specter of a procedural
device drastically limiting a substantive legal provision. What these courts
ignore is that the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework is not a
standard of liability, but a procedural device designed to facilitate the orderly presentation of evidence. 126 This three-step procedural device can be
applied to employment discrimination cases without regard to the substantive standard of liability applied to the claims. Certainly, it can be applied to
the standards that Congress established in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Under McDonnell-Douglas, a plaintiff must first prove a prima facie
case. The defendant then responds with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, and the plaintiff retains the burden of ultimately proving that the prohibited characteristic was "a motivating factor" in the decision. One way
that the plaintiff can make this showing is by demonstrating that the defendant's proffered reasons are dishonest-what some people would call the
traditional pretext showing. However, as discussed in the preceding section,
the plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant was dishonest. She
can meet her burden by pointing to other evidence sufficient to create an
inference of discrimination. 27 The plaintiff can also meet her ultimate burden by presenting evidence "that the defendant's reason, while true, is only
one of the reasons for its conduct,
and another motivating factor is the plain' 28
tiffs protected characteristic."'
Sartor v. Spherion Corp., No. 02C4312, 2003 WL 22765049, at *4 (Nov. 21, 2003 N.D. Ill.) ("A plaintiff alleging race and sex discrimination may proceed along one of two routes in proving her case ...

(citing McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973)).
124.
Sartor,2003 WL 22765049, at *4 (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 (2003));
cf Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., 340 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff should get a
mixed motive instruction because of the quality of her circumstantial evidence).
125.
See, e.g., Sanders v. City of Montgomery, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
126.
See infra Part 11.B (discussing three-part burden shifting).
127.
See supra Part H.A.
128.
Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1198 (N.D. Iowa
2003); see also Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 0310803, 2004 WL 1427046, *5 (5th Cir. June 25,
2004); Peterson v. Scott County, No. 024737, 2004 WL 1179368, at *8-*9 (D. Minn. May 27, 2004)
(adopting a "modified" structure for McDonnell-Douglasanalysis); Walker v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
No. 002604, 2004 WL 114977, at *5-*6 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2004); Brown v. Westaff (USA), Inc., 301 F.
Supp. 2d 1011, 1016-19 (D. Minn. 2004); Jones v. Southcorr, LLC, No. 103CV00499, 2004 WL
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The benefits of this approach for a plaintiff like Willie Thomas could be
significant. The Troy City School Board explained that it did not select Mr.
Thomas because of his credit history and his relative lack of academic experience and education. As the court explained, there was no reason to
doubt the defendant's honest belief that these factors motivated the decision. 129 Under the either-or approach to discrimination, the inquiry ended
there. But, it was also the case that a predominantly white group of selectors
ranked a slate of eight candidates and relegated all three of the admittedly
qualified black applicants to the bottom half of the list.' 30 If the court had
been focusing not on the honesty of the employer's proffered reasons, but
instead on whether the evidence raised an inference that race was a motivating factor in the process, Mr. Thomas might well have survived summary
judgment. 131
The 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, together with Costa's
reminder that discrimination can be (and usually is) proven by circumstantial evidence, bring some clarity to two important points in antidiscrimination law. First, an employer's honesty or dishonesty is not the appropriate
focus of a Title VII inquiry. Instead, the question courts must ask is simply
whether the available evidence raises any inference of discrimination. While
employer dishonesty may be sufficient to raise that inference, it is not necessary. Second, a court will rarely, if ever, be able to say with certainty
whether discriminatory actions were taken consciously or unconsciously.
This is an inevitable consequence of the centrality of circumstantial evidence to the inquiry. While circumstantial evidence can allow a factfinder to
conclude that the facts surrounding an employment decision suggest that
race or gender played a role, no amount of circumstantial evidence will
permit the factfinder to determine whether the discriminatory impulse at
play was conscious but unspoken or was the product of the decisionmaker's
unconscious stereotypes and biases. Those courts and commentators that
have focused on the distinction between conscious and unconscious discrimination-suggesting that Title VII reaches one but not the other-are
drawing a distinction that the law does not require and that cannot, in any
event, be applied.

1541597, at *8 (M.D.N.C. July 8, 2004); Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860
(M.D.N.C. 2003); Carey v. Fedex Ground Packaging Sys., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 902, 914 (S.D. Ohio
2004); Loyd v. City of Bethlehem, No. 02CV00830, 2004 WL 540452, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2004).
129.
Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d. 1303, 1308-09 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
130.
d. at 1306 n.1.
131.
Of course, if Mr. Thomas's case had survived summary judgment and gone to trial, there is a
reasonable chance that the Troy City Board of Education could have successfully demonstrated that it
would have taken the same action even absent the impermissible motivating factor. If that were to happen, Mr. Thomas could not receive damages and would not be instated to the position of superintendent.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(B)(ii). The benefit of the finding of liability would be that it might force the
Board of Education to reexamine its practices and to be more aware of the possibility of unconscious
biases in the process. For Mr. Thomas himself, it would likely be a somewhat bitter victory.
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III. CHALLENGES TO UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION:
POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS

In this section, I examine how courts have treated cases alleging that
excessive subjectivity in an employer's decisionmaking process resulted in
discrimination. These claims, which are as likely to be targeting unconscious bias as hidden, conscious bias, expose the impossibility of distinguishing between the two. Moreover, to the extent that plaintiffs have been
successful in pressing these claims, they further demonstrate that Title VII
has long prohibited even unconscious discrimination. Allegations of excessive subjectivity can be made in individual disparate treatment casestypically at the final stage of the McDonnell-Douglas framework-or in
class action suits in which large groups of employees challenge an employer's general policy of delegating uncabined discretion to decisionmakers in the workplace. I consider both approaches here, concluding that neither is without some difficulty, but both have potential for targeting unconscious discrimination.
A. Individual Claims of Excessively Subjective Decisionmaking
In individual disparate treatment cases, arguments about the excessive
subjectivity of the decisionmaking process are generally raised at the third
stage of the McDonnell-Douglasframework. Every court of appeals in the
federal system has recognized that "subjective evaluations 'are more susceptible of abuse and more likely to mask pretext,"" 32 and a demonstration
of excessive reliance on subjective criteria has been accepted as evidence
supporting an inference of discrimination. 133 As one court has explained it,
"when that evaluation is to any degree subjective and when the evaluators
132.
Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d
59, 64-65 (3d. Cir. 1989)); see also Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir.
2002) ("Courts view with skepticism subjective evaluation methods such as the one here."); Saleh v.
Upadhyay, Nos. 992137, 992188, 001744, 2001 WL 585085, at *13 (4th Cir. May 31, 2001)); Bergene
v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cit. 2001); Hodgens
v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cit. 1998);Walker v. N.Y. State Office of Mental
Health, No. 977367, 1998 WL 639392, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 1998) ("[G]reater possibilities for abuse are
inherent in the utilization of such subjective values."); Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1170 (7th
Cir. 1998) ("It is true that an employer's use of subjective criteria may leave it more vulnerable to a
finding of discrimination, when a plaintiff can point tosome objective evidence indicating that the subjective evaluation is a mask for discrimination."): McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1129
(8th Cir. 1998); Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 482 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he criteria 1PCO
used tomake promotion decisions was highly subjective, which, as this court has held in previous cases,
makes iteasier to discriminate."); Tye v. Bd. of Fduc. of the Polaris Joint Vocational Sch. Dist., 811
denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539,
F.2d 310, 315 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
1548 (1lth Cir. 1985); Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 192 (5th Cir. 1983); Bell v.
Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[S]ubjective promotion procedures areto be closely
scrutinized because of their susceptibility to discriminatory abuse."); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037,
1046 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[Slubjective decision making provides an opportunity for unlawful discrimination."); Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 528-29 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870
(1976); Shacke v. Southworth, 521 F.2d 51, 55-56 (6th Cir. 1975).
133.
See, e.g., Garrett,305 F.3d at 1217; McCullough, 140 F.3d at 1129.
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are themselves not members of the protected minority, the legitimacy and
nondiscriminatory basis of the articulated
reason for the decision may be
134
subject to particularly close scrutiny."'
Focusing the discussion of subjectivity on the third stage of the
McDonnell-Douglas framework is, in itself, a modest victory for plaintiffs
hoping to get past summary judgment. Recall that, as an element of the
prima facie case, a plaintiff is required to show that he is qualified for the
position sought.135 Employers have argued that the plaintiff should therefore
have to demonstrate as part of his prima facie case that he was qualified
according to the subjective criteria applied by the employer, If this require-

ment were imposed, it would be unlikely that any plaintiff could make out a
prima facie case and survive summary judgment, because the very fact that
the plaintiff did not get the position sought tends to prove that he did not
meet the employer's subjective standards. As a consequence, "the use of
subjective [hiring] could go unchallenged."'' 36 Courts, therefore, have con-

sistently rejected this approach, concluding that "an employer may not 'utilize wholly subjective standards by which to judge its employees' qualifications and then plead lack of qualification
when its promotion process... is
1 37
challenged as discriminatory."

Instead, to make out a prima facie case, an employee must show that
she met the objective or minimum qualifications for the position in question. She is not required to show that she met her employer's subjective
standards. It is the employer's burden to raise these subjective standards in
response to the plaintiffs prima facie case. Once the defendant has raised a
lack of qualification as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the ad-

verse employment action, the plaintiff can point to the subjective nature of
the decisionmaking process as support for an argument that the decision was

motivated by discrimination. A plaintiff in an individual case can thus use
evidence of excessive subjectivity to survive summary judgment, and ultimately to
prove that discrimination played a role in the adverse employment
38
action.'

134.
Page v. Bolger, 645.F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1981).
135.
See supra Part B.A.
136.
Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1982).
137.
Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Crawford v. Western
Elec. Co.. 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980); cf Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir.
1993); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990); Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
760 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1985); Lee v. Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959, 963-64 (5th Cir.
1981); Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1981).
138.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Data Sys. Int'l, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1305 (D. Kan. 2003);
Garrett, 305 F.3d at 1217-18; Medina, 238 F.3d at 681 ("[D]istinguishing legitimate employment decisions based entirely on subjective criteria and those in which subjective criteria serve as pretext for
discrimination can only be made by weighing the employer's credibility."); Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 321 (3d Cir. 2000); McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1129
(8th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Cal. State Dep't of Corr., No. 9115870, 1992 WL 197414, at *3 (9th Cir.
Aug. 18, 1992); Lee, 634 F.2d at 963-64; see also Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Educ., 917 F.2d 1391, 1399
(6th Cir. 1990) (reversing a district court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict and concluding
that "the alleged use of subjective criteria was merely a poor disguise for discriminatory action by the
Board").
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These claims of excessive subjectivity do not-and cannot-distinguish

between subjectivity that allows unconscious bias into the decision and subjectivity that allows a consciously biased decisionmaker to make a discriminatory choice. Not surprisingly, when courts talk about the risks of excessively subjective decisionmaking, they tend to talk in terms of the potential
for masking intentional discrimination rather than the potential for intrusion
of unconscious discriminatory attitudes. 39 Essentially, "evidence of subjec-

tive, standardless decisionmaking by company officials, which is a convenient mechanism for discrimination," is treated by many courts as satisfying
the requirement that the plaintiff prove intent because of the possibility that

unrestricted subjective decisionmaking processes mask bad intent. 140 But,
allowing plaintiffs to demonstrate pretext by showing subjective decisionmaking also allows the survival of cases in which the discrimination was
unconscious. 14 '

In a few cases, courts confronting subjective decisionmaking processes
have specifically recognized the possibility that unconscious discrimination
played a role in the decision. 142 The First Circuit, for example, has explicitly
concluded that a system of uncabined reliance on supervisory judgment
resulting in discrimination against a black plaintiff is impermissible "regardless of whether the employer consciously intended to base the evaluations

on race, or simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias.

143

In

139.
See, e.g., Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2001); Brill v. Lante Corp.,
119 F.3d 1266, 1272-73 (7th Cir. 1997); Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995);
Jordan v. Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 343-44 (7th Cir. 2000).
140.
Boykin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 706 F.2d 1384, 1390 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1006 (1984); see also Rowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972); cf. Hill v. K-Mart
Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1983).
141.
See, e.g., Jessie Alien, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Discrimination,61 BROOK. L.
REV. 1299, 1331 (1995) ("[I1f disparate treatment plaintiffs can prove discrimination simply by disproving defendants' explanations for the challenged actions, discrimination based on the unconscious use of
racial stereotypes can trigger liability unless factfinders were explicitly admonished to immunize this
type of discrimination."); Wax, supra note 19, at 1149-50 (noting that there is no doctrinal barrier to
plaintiffs succeeding on claims of unconscious discrimination).
See Thomas, 1992 WL 197414, at *3 (noting that the defendant's reliance on the plaintiff's
142.
answers to questions in an oral interview as the justification for non-selection "should be carefully scrutinized for pretext because it is subjective and vague ....Were we to hold that the unsupported claim
that a particular candidate was a 'superior' interviewee was sufficient without more to require summary
of conscious and unconjudgment for an employer, we would immunize from effective review all sorts
scious discrimination."); Johnson v. Stone, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 656, 658 (D. Colo. 1992)
(finding for the plaintiff in a race discrimination case where the plaintiff presented evidence that he was
not promoted and that his employer had nicknamed him "Bub," but without other evidence suggesting
discrimination); Nichelson v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F.2d 1153, 1156 (6th Cir. 1985) ("We are aware that
employment discrimination based on race can occur both in subtle and obvious ways, both of which are
contrary to the equal opportunity goals set out by Congress in Title VIL."); EEOC v. Inland Marine
Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984) ("ITihe court ruled that Inland Marine had discriminated
without 'malice.' The court's finding that this discrimination manifested itself subtly, rather than through
the 'culpability' of the foreman, or though a "scheme or plan,' does not diminish the fact that the court
did find intentional discrimination.") (citations omitted), cert. denied sub. nom., 469 U.S. 855 (1984);
Lynn, 656 F.2d at 1343; Sweeney v. Bd. of Tr. of Keene State Coll., 604 F.2d 106, 113 n.12 (1st Cir.
1979); Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering whether
the plaintiff had produced evidence that the employer's subjective judgments "reflect[ed] unconscious
racial bias").
143.
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999).
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Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.,'" the court faced a challenge to the legitimacy of performance appraisals that had been relied on to include the plaintiff in a reduction in force. 145 Myrtle Thomas had been employed at Kodak
for almost twenty years when she was laid off because of relatively low
performance appraisals in the years immediately preceding her layoff. For
the ten years preceding the negative appraisals, Ms. Thomas's performance
at Kodak had been universally praised. Both supervisors and customers described her as dedicated, professional, and integral to the Kodak team. She
Her performance ratings
received regular pay raises, awards, and bonuses.
146
were fives and sixes on a seven-point scale.
In 1989, Ms. Thomas's circumstances changed considerably when Kodak appointed a new Customer Support Manager. Ms. Thomas described
her relationship with the new manager as professional and did not identify
any racially derogatory comments or other overtly racially motivated misconduct.147 However, the new manager made it significantly more difficult
for Ms. Thomas to perform her responsibilities by interfering with client
relationships and treating her worse than other Customer Support Representatives. As well, Ms. Thomas's performance ratings dropped precipitously,
falling to twos and threes in one year. 148 Kodak's performance appraisal
judgment of one supervisor to control an emsystem allowed the subjective
49
ployee's evaluation. 1
In bringing suit, Ms. Thomas did "not argue that Kodak has articulated
a false reason for her layoff (for example, excessive tardiness) in order to
disguise the actual, unrelated reason (her race)-what one might describe as
a 'truth versus lies' claim-rather, she challenge[d] the racial neutrality of
the proffered reason itself.' 150 Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, the First Circuit concluded that Ms. Thomas had a legitimate claim for disparate treatment. The court explained:
[I]f an employer evaluates employees of one race less favorably
than employees of another race who have performed equivalently,
and if race, rather than some other factor, is the basis for the difference in evaluations, then the disfavored employees have been subjected to "discriminat[ion] . . .because of ...race" ..... The ultimate question is whether the employee has been treated disparately
"because of race." This is so regardless of whether the employer

144.
145.
146.
147.
148149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 58.
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on race, or simply did
consciously intended to base the evaluations1 51
so because of unthinking stereotypes or bias.
The court thus explicitly recognized that in a subjective evaluation system, there is a risk that evaluations will be based on unconscious discriminatory attitudes, and that a process infected by this subtle bias is no more
permissible than a decision influenced by conscious racism or sexism. The
Kodak case is one of a few exceptions to the general rule that courts assume,
without discussion, that any evidence of racial or gender motivation is evidence of conscious bias. 5 Kodak appropriately recognized that the conscious or unconscious status of the discriminatory intent does not matter for
the purpose of proving liability. Despite the language of conscious intent
that has become standard in Title VII cases, the law does not care in these
instances whether the discrimination faced by the plaintiff was conscious or
not.
The facts in Kodak do not present any more evidence about whether the
discrimination was conscious or unconscious than do those in other cases in
which summary judgment is deemed inappropriate in light of the subjectiv53
ity of the process. For example, in McCullough v. Real Foods,1
a white
woman with a sixth-grade education was promoted to a deli manager position, while a college-educated black woman was passed over. 154 The promotion decision was not based on any formal criteria, but instead on one man's
"perception of each of the two employees' abilities, work ethic, and dedication to the job." 155 The only evidence specifically suggesting that the decisionmaker was racially prejudiced was an incident described by the plaintiff
"in which [the decisionmaker] greeted a white employee while ignoring
her." 156 Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
employer, the Eighth Circuit noted that "the extremely subjective nature 157
of
the employer's stated promotion criteria" was "critical to [its] analysis.'
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that, although a college degree might not be
necessary to manage a deli, Ms. McCullough's qualifications were better
than those of the woman selected to be deli manager, enough so that it was
reasonable to assume that "something other than" sound business judgment

151.

Id. (citation omitted).

152.
See Toward a StructuralAccount, supra note 21, at 130 ("Thomas is significant for the court's
willingness to formulate the conception of discrimination underlying traditional disparate treatment
theory to include differences in treatment based on unconscious bias as well as conscious animus.").
153.
140 F.3d 1123 (8th Cir. 1998).
154.
Id. at 1125.
155.
Id.
156.
Id. at 1126. The court also noted that between 1985 and 1998, the store had employed four black
managers at different times. There were six total managerial positions, although three of them saw next-

to-no turnover. Id. Without more information about the length of time each of these managers was employed and the applicant pool for managerial positions, it is difficult to assess the significance of these
numbers.
157.
Id. at1129.
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motivated the decision. 158 That something else could have been racial
bias. "9

There was no more evidence of conscious intent (or employer dishonesty) in McCullough than in the First Circuit's Kodak decision. In either
case-and in any circumstance where a decisionmaker has exercised subjective judgment-the decisionmaker could have been acting with conscious
intent to discriminate or could have been motivated by unconscious bias. In

both of these cases, however, there was some evidence (including the subjectivity of the evaluation process) that was sufficient to raise questions
about the role that racial bias-whatever its cognitive source-might have
played in the decisions. Both Kodak and McCullough were decided using
the traditional McDonnell-Douglas framework. If these cases, and others
like them, had been decided after Costa, the plaintiff's burden-to demon-

strate that race or gender was a motivating factor in the decision-would
have been much lighter than the onerous burden of providing sufficient evidence to create an inference of employer dishonesty. This change would not
have affected Ms. Thomas or Ms. McCullough, as their cases survived even
under the more burdensome standard, but the motivating factor approach

might, and should, alter the outcome in some cases that would otherwise
end because of the plaintiff s inability to catch her employer in a lie.

Of course, even taking the mixed motive approach, not all cases challenging subjective decisionmaking will, or should, survive summary judgment. Courts have been very careful to observe that "nothing in Title VII
bans outright the use of subjective evaluation criteria."' 6 Many courts, the
United States Supreme Court among them, have emphasized that subjective
criteria may be essential to any number of job categories, and that employers must be permitted to evaluate job candidates based on those subjective
criteria where they are relevant.t 61 "Some qualities-for example, common
sense, good judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact-cannot be

Id. at 1128-29.
158.
Id.
159.
Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Denney v. City of Al160.
bany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1186 (lth Cir. 2001) ("It is inconceivable that Congress intended antidiscrimination statutes to deprive an employer of the ability to rely on important criteria in its employment decisions merely because those criteria are only capable of subjective evaluation."); Chapman v.
Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 2000); Richter v. Revco D.S., Inc., 959 F. Supp. 999,
1010 (S.D. Ind. 1997), affd, 142 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1998); Weihaupt v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419,
429 (7th Cir. 1989); Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1427 (7th Cir. 1986); Vitug v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 88 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Title VII does not forbid subjective selection processes.").
See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1033 ("[Slubjective evaluations of a job candidate are often critical to
161.
the decisionmaking process, and if anything, are becoming more so in our increasingly service-oriented
economy."); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988); Denney, 247 F.3d at 118586; Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Indeed, in many situations [subjective criteria] are indispensable to the process .... "); Robertson v. Sikorsky, 2000 WL
33381019, at *3-*4 (D. Conn. July 5, 2001); see also Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 46, at
713; Towarda StructuralAccount, supra note 21, at 103-05; Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII
to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 987 (1982).
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measured accurately through standardized testing techniques."' 162 Courts

may be particularly deferential to an employer's subjective judgment in jobs
requiring significant public interaction, 163 or in supervisory and management positions.' 6" Thus, "a plaintiff can not ultimately prove discrimination

merely because his/her employer relied upon highly subjective165qualities (i.e.
'drive' or 'enthusiasm') in making an employment decision."'
Recognition of the role that subjective judgment may legitimately play
in employment decisions has created two limitations for plaintiffs challenging a subjective process. First, if an employer "articulates a clear and rea-

sonably specific factual basis upon which it based its subjective opinion,"
courts tend to be more deferential to that opinion. 166 As one court has ex-

plained the standard, using a hypothetical applicant for a sales clerk position:
[I1t might not be sufficient for a defendant employer to say it did
not hire the plaintiff applicant simply because "I did not like his appearance" with no further explanation. However, if the defendant

employer said, "I did not like his appearance because his hair was
uncombed and he had dandruff all over his shoulders," or "because
he had his nose pierced," or "because his fingernails were dirty," or
"because he came to the interview wearing short pants and a Tshirt," the defendant would have articulated a "clear and reasonably

162.
163.

Id.
164.

Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
See, e.g., Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1033. In Chapman, the court stated:
Take, for example, a job requiring continuing interaction with the public, such as a sales clerk
or wait staff position. Attitude, articulateness, and enthusiasm, as well as appearance, can be
vitally important in such a job, yet there are few if any ways to gauge such qualities objectively or from a written application. Interviews give prospective employers a chance to see if
an applicant has the kind of personal qualities a service job requires and can be the best way
an employer has to determine how a person interacts with others.

See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 991; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1033-34. The Chapman court noted:
Personal qualities also factor heavily into employment decisions concerning supervisory or
professional positions .... Traits such as "common sense, good judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact" often must be assessed primarily in a subjective fashion, yet they are
essential to an individual's success in a supervisory or professional position.
Id.; see also Risher v. Aldridge, 889 F.2d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Subjective criteria necessarily and
legitimately enter into personnel decisions involving supervisory positions.") (citation omitted).
165.
Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med. Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 321 (3d Cir. 2000).
166.
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1034; see also Bymie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93,
104-105 (2d Cir. 2001) ("['W]e have also cautioned that 'an employer may not use wholly subjective and
unarticulated standards to judge employee performance for purposes of promotion' . . . Accordingly, an
'employer's explanation of its reasons must be clear and specific' in order to 'afford the employee a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.') (citations omitted); Obi v. Anne Arundel County, 142 F.
Supp. 2d 655, 663-64 (D. Md. 2001) (accepting the employer's conclusion that the plaintiff's interview
performance was inferior to that of the individual selected for the position where the employer explained
in detail the particular elements of the interview that had not gone well for the plaintiff); EEOC v. Joe's
Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1280 n.17 (11 th Cir. 2000); Conner v. Fort Gordon Bus Co., 761 F.2d
1495, 1500 (11 th Cir. 1985); Colon-Sanchez v. Marsh, 733 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1984).
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applicant's bad (in
specific" basis for its subjective opinion-the
67
the employer's view) appearance.'

Second, plaintiffs challenging an employer's subjective practices generally need to point to some evidence beyond the subjective evaluation system

itself to support their claims. 168 This evidence may include comments suggesting stereotypical attitudes in the workplace, 169 statistical evidence showing race or gender disparities in hiring or promotion,' 7" evidence that the

person selected for the position had significantly poorer qualifications than
the plaintiff, 17 1 or evidence that the plaintiff was treated differently from

white or male employees. 72 Thus, while a subjective evaluation system will
raise a red flag, the plaintiff must generally provide additional support to
process allowed
prevail on her claim that the subjective decisionmaking
17 3
race or gender to play a part in the decision.
While these requirements limit which cases will survive summary

judgment, they also suggest a limit on which cases should survive. One of
the frustrating implications of current sociological and psychological research is that we all act with unconscious biases and stereotypes-no matter
how good our intentions. Given that possibility, it seems at least arguable
that every time a minority or woman is denied a job or a promotion, or suf167.
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1034.
168.
See, e.g., Nichols v. Caroline, No. JFM023525, 2004 WL 350337, at *5 n.9 (D. Md. Feb. 23,
2004); Snoddy v. City of Nacogdoches, 98 Fed. Appx. 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2004); Brooks v. Ameren IJE,
92 FEP Cases 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that "subjectivity alone does not render an employment decision infirm" where the plaintiff has no other evidence to suggest pretext); Green v. Maricopa
County Cmty. College Sch. Dist., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1125 (D. Ariz. 2003) ("[A] plaintiff may combine proof of reliance on subjective criteria with other evidence to show pretext."); Sattar v. Motorola,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that subjective criteria can support a finding of discrimination when other "evidence indicatfes] that the subjective evaluation [was) a mask for discrimination," and that "[it is that extra piece of objective evidence that Sattar has not provided"); Richter v.
Revco D.S., Inc., 959 F. Supp. 999, 1010-11 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (presented no evidence in an age discrimination case tending to show that the employer's subjective decisionmaking allowed stereotyping to
occur); Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The use of subjective factors
to evaluate applicants for hire or promotion is not illegal per se.").
169.
See, e.g., Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard, 305 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
manager told the plaintiff that he and others "were tired of hearing about 'that diversity stuff"); Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc., 983 F.2d 1204, 1210 (2d Cir. 1993); Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 339 (3d
Cir. 2002); Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
170.
See, e.g., Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., II1 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1112 (E.D. Ark. 2000)
("[Slubjective employment procedures are to be closely scrutinized in disparate treatment cases because
of their susceptibility to discriminatory abuse and, coupled with statistical evidence of a pattern of a
discrimination, may be evidence of pretext."); Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312, 1320 (8th Cir. 1983); see
also Voltz v. Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., No. 021010, 2004 WL 100507, at *7 (10th Cir. Jan. 22, 2004)
(stating that the plaintiff's statistical evidence actually suggested that Coca-Cola made strong efforts to
hire minority candidates; these statistics limited the court's willingness to assume that subjectivity lead
to impermissibly motivated decisions).
171.
See, e.g., McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., Garrett,305 F.3d at 1216-17; Sauar, 138 F.3d at 1170-71 (holding that a plaintiff can
172.
show pretext in subjective criteria by pointing to evidence that "others whose work style was similar to
his received consistently better subjective evaluations").
173.
See, e.g., Casillas v. U.S. Navy, 735 F.2d 338, 345 (9th Cir. 1984) ("An employer's use of
subjective criteria is to be considered by the trial court with the other facts and circumstances of the
case.").
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fers some other adverse employment action, race or gender played some
role in the decision. If that is true, how can the law accommodate that reality?
A number of commentators have argued that in light of the considerable
tangible effects of unconscious discrimination on the employment opportunities of women and minority job applicants, the law should be reformed to
acknowledge the pervasiveness of unconscious discrimination. 174 Some of
the proposals that have been made are quite interesting. David Oppenheimer, for example, recommends recognizing a claim for what he calls
"negligent discrimination": holding employers responsible for failing to
carefully scrutinize decisions in which a minority or female applicant was
not selected for a position.175 Linda Hamilton Krieger recommends adopting
a two-tiered structure for Title VII liability, with compensatory and punitive
damages available on a finding of conscious intent to discriminate, and
more limited damages available when discrimination motivated the decision
in an unconscious fashion. 176 Without rejecting any of these suggestions as
interesting ways to interpret or refine current law, I argue that there is a necessary limit on what private litigation can do to remedy unconscious discrimination.
The reach of cases not already encompassed (in theory) by existing law
includes primarily those cases in which the plaintiff has no-or very littleevidence beyond his prima facie case to support a claim of discrimination.
Imagine an African-American lawyer who applies for a position as an associate in a law firm. He meets the firm's minimum qualifications; in fact, he
graduated near the top of his class at a good law school. He is one of four
candidates interviewed for the position in a day-long series of interviews.
The other three candidates are white, and one of them is female. The firm
hires a white man to fill the position.
The rejected candidate files suit. He has no difficulty making out a
prima facie case: he is a member of a protected class, he applied for a position for which he was qualified, and someone else was selected to fill the
position. The employer explains, as its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the selection decision that although all of the candidates interviewed
were qualified, they selected the applicant who seemed to fit best with the
firm. After discovery, the plaintiff has the following information: the candiSee, e.g., Content of Our Categories,supra note 15, at 1162-66; Oppenheimer, supra note 15, at
174.
967-72; Flagg, supra note 15, at 2038-51; McGinley, supra note 21, at 480-90; Toward a Structural
Account, supra note 21, at 144-57.
175.
Oppenheimer, supra note 15, at 969-70. Oppenheimer argues that
[wihenever an employer fails to act to prevent discrimination which it knows, or should
know, is occurring, which it expects to occur, or which it should expect to occur, it should be
held negligent. Liability should also be recognized when an employer breaches the statutorily
established standard of care by making employment decisions which have a discriminatory
effect, without first scrutinizing its processes, searching for less discriminatory alternatives,
and examining its own motives for evidence of stereotyping.
Id.
176.
Content of Our Categories, supra note 15, at 1243.
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date selected had qualifications almost identical to the plaintiff's; the firm's
associate ranks show a slight racial imbalance in proportion to the qualified
pool of applicants, but it is similar to most law firms in the city; the firm has
strong EEOC policies and an affirmative action plan to recruit minority
hires through its summer associate program; there is no evidence of racially
derogatory or racially stereotyping remarks made by any of the lawyers who
conducted the interviews or who were on the firm's hiring committee; and
none of the firm's current or former associates have been willing to offer
complaints about the firm's culture with regard to race relations.
The plaintiff remains fi'rmly convinced that his lack of "fit" with the
firm's culture reflects racial bias, but he does not have legally admissible
evidence to support his conviction. He might find an expert to testify that
law firm culture generally exhibits significant racial bias and that the subjective criterion of "fit" is precisely the kind of ambiguous standard that
allows unconscious biases into play.177 But, successful expert testimony has
generally used statistics or stereotyped comments from the particular work78
place to explain the operation of unconscious bias in a particular instance.1
Because he does not have that type of evidence, our plaintiff may have
some difficulty obtaining a quality expert report.
In this case, how is a judge, even with the best of intentions, to distinguish our plaintiff's case from any other suit in which a plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case but has little else to support his claim? If it is not possible
to separate the cases in which unconscious discrimination actually played a
role from those in which it did not (and the research raises substantial questions about whether there are any cases in which unconscious bias plays no
role), then there
is no way to assess which plaintiffs should win and which
1 79
should lose.
Furthermore, if our plaintiff can win his case, then how is an employer--even acting with the best of intentions-to avoid violating the law?
One of the primary goals of Title VII is to change employer behavior in
order to avoid the harms of discrimination.! 80 Requiring that a Title VII
177.

See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 50,at 493 (discussing the culture of corporate law firms and

considering explanations for the small numbers of African-Americans among the associate and partner
ranks).
178.
See, e.g., Fiske et al., supra note 19, at 1051 (describing testimony offered in Price Waterhouse); Deborah Dyson, Note, Expert Testimony and "Subtle Discrimination"in the Workplace: Do We
Now Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv.37, 55-56

(2004) (describing expert testimony on subtle discrimination offered in a race discrimination case).
179.
See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-mart, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189, 192 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that defendants' "most significant criticism" of the conclusions drawn by an expert on sex stereotyping "is that
[the expert] cannot determine with any specificity how regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in
employment decisions"); Wax, supra note 19, at 1134 (noting that "if unconscious bias is indeed 'subtle'
...
determinations

180.

of liability will very often be in error").

See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) ("Although Title VII

seeks 'to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,'
its 'primary objective,' like that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide
redress but to avoid harm.") (citations omitted); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754

(1998).
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plaintiff provide some evidence of discrimination creates an incentive for
employers to operate their workplaces in a less discriminatory fashion. If an
employer knows that careful adherence to procedure, avoiding differential
treatment of employees, and maintaining and enforcing policies to encourage a diverse workforce will aid the employer in avoiding liability, it will be
more likely to adopt these behaviors. If engaging in this kind of good bein an individual case,
havior does not provide some defense to legal liability
81
there will be a reduced incentive to behave well.1
This is not to say that employers should not be held liable for unconscious bias because it is too hard to fix, or that judges should not recognize
claims in which unconscious bias was at play because they are too hard to
see. In fact, while current research suggests that eliminating bias completely
may not be possible, 182 decisionmakers can certainly be aware of the possibility that unconscious biases are affecting their decisions, and can act with
some effort to control for that possibility.183 Employers can, and should,
carefully examine employment decisions that could contain any element of
discriminatory bias, whether conscious or not.'" And, as I have argued
above, judges should stop imposing the unreasonable burden that plaintiffs
prove employer "dishonesty" and should be more receptive to claims in
which unconscious bias may have been operating. The relevant distinction
to be drawn is not between cases of conscious and unconscious bias, but
between cases in which there is sufficient proof of bias and cases in which
there is not. Shifting the focus of analysis off of an employer's honesty or
dishonesty, and recognizing that employer decisions can have both discriminatory and non-discriminatory motivations would greatly improve the
relationship between how decisions are actually made and how the legal
standards are applied to those decisions. But, even if judges and employers
take these steps, some plaintiffs will not be able to prove that discrimination
played a role in their individual circumstances.

181.
Of course, allowing formalistic adherence to "good policies" to serve as an easy defense without
continued evaluation of what is actually happening in a workplace risks insulating discrimination from
view. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudenceof Education and Prevention in Employment DiscriminationLaw,
22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 (2001); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance:
UnderstandingEmployer Litigation Prevention Strategies,3 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (1999);
Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 46, at 705-08.
182.
See, e.g., Wilson & Brekke, supra note 39, at 117-22; John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster:
The Case Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effect, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN
SOC. PSYCHOL. 361, 361 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999); Wax, supra note 19, at 1161-69.
183.
See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudiceand Discrimination, in I THE HANDBOOK OF
SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 384 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998).

184.

See Oppenheimer, supra note 15, at 967-72 (arguing for a theory of negligent discrimination).
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Using ClassAction Litigation to Challenge
UnconsciousDiscrimination

Class action lawsuits may provide a solution to some of the proof problems presented in individual claims. By targeting workplace policies more
generally, without reference (at least initially) to the specific merits of each
individual case, class litigation has the potential to challenge employer policies that permit the uncabined exercise of subjective judgment. 85 Class
litigation has the added benefit that it can go beyond an individual instance
of discrimination to challenge the intrusion of both conscious and 8uncon6

scious discrimination into the culture and structure of the workplace. 1

In her recent article, Targeting Workplace Context, Tristin Green argues

for the potential of class actions to "identify and address organizational
sources of discrimination." 18 7 She observes that employment discrimination
class litigation today has a somewhat different approach from the early Title
VII class suits, in that it "seek[s] the type of organizational change that is
intended to reduce the incidence of discriminatory decisions based on subtle, often unconscious bias in individuals rather than to remove systems ' 'or
structures that themselves perpetuate past segregation or discrimination. 18
Modem employment class litigation seeks these new remedial forms be-

cause it is targeted to modem discrimination-less overt, but no less important to challenge.
The number of employment discrimination class actions filed in federal
court has gradually increased over the past 15 years, with about 73 or 74
cases filed in federal court each year for the past three years. 189 Allegations
that an employer's hiring, firing, promotion, or other practices are based on
185.
Class litigation has long been understood to have a "public law" aspect that may make it particularly suitable for addressing a problem as far-reaching and insidious as the intrusion of stereotypes and
unconscious bias as an impediment to true equal employment opportunity. See, e.g., Abraham Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1291-92 (1976) (describing the
evolution of class action suits as part of the demise of the private litigation bipolar structure and as a
mechanism for presenting group interests for adjudication); Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of
Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L REV. 905, 906
(1978) (describing Title VII as implicating public law rights); Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the
Rights of Third Parties,87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 321 (1988) (identifying consent decrees in employment
discrimination cases as a hallmark of public law); Natalie C. Scott, Don't Forget Me! The Client in a
Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 561, 572 (2002) ("The public law litigation model
emphasizes the increased importance of the remedial, or post-judgment phase of litigation, often critical
in class actions and useful as a model for the dynamics of those class actions that are resolved through
settlement.").
186.
See Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 46, at 660 ("Without attention to the context and
complexity of decision making, an individual instance of discrimination may be resolved while the
structures, cultures, and practices that facilitated that discrimination in the first place remain unchanged."); Sturm, supra note 49, at 460 (noting that instances of unconscious discrimination may "be
visible only in the aggregate").
187.
Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 46, at 661; see also Tristin Green, Work Culture and
Discrimination,93 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
188.
Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 46, at 688.
189.
See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REv.
813, 820 n.31 (2004); see also 2003 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CIS. ANN. REP., at thl. X-5, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/appendiceslx5.pdf (Sept. 30, 2003).
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excessively subjective decisionmaking are among the issues raised most
frequently in these class suits. t90 The past decade has seen dozens of class
action suits claiming discrimination against a protected class because of an
employer's subjective decisionmaking.' 91 Perhaps the most famous class
action in recent memory-the sex discrimination claim brought against
Wal-Mart stores throughout the country-was certified in June 2004 on the
basis of precisely this theory of excessive subjectivity. 92 As the Wal-Mart
court explained in certifying the class of at least 1.5 million women, "where,
as here, [excessive] subjectivity is part of a consistent corporate policy and
supported by other evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination,
hesitated" to find that the requirements for class certification
courts have not 93
met.'
been
have
In order to bring a class action suit alleging discrimination in employment, plaintiffs in federal court must meet the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23, which imposes a two-step class certification analysis.
Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that their proposed class meets the requirements of 23(a)-numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.' 94 The class must then fit into one of the categories defined
in 23(b).' 95 In employment litigation, classes are certified as either (b)(2)
"injunctive" classes (where the defendant has acted or failed to act in such a
way that declaratory or injunctive relief to the class as a whole is appropriate), or as (b)(3) classes (a catch-all provision for classes that do not fit
analysis
neatly into the other categories). 19 6 Both aspects of the Rule 23 97
have posed difficulties for employment discrimination class claims.'
Most courts analyzing whether to certify classes alleging excessively
subjective decisionmaking have focused on the requirements of 23(a) and
particularly on the element of commonality. 9 8 While courts considering
whether to certify a proposed class are not technically ruling on the merits
of claims-indeed, the Supreme Court has emphatically held quite the opposite 9 9-the reality is that the procedural decisions are often hard to distinguish from the substantive analysis. For instance, it is particularly hard to
separate the substantive question of whether the plaintiffs have identified a
190.
See Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 46, at 683; Robert L. Clayton & Bethany Brantley
Johnson, An Overview of Employment Class Actions, 14 No. 4 PRAC. LITIGATOR 33, 36 (July 2003);
Gary M. Kramer, No Class: Post-1991 Barriers to Rule 23 Certification of Across-the-BoardEmployment Discrimination Cases, 15 LAB. LAW. 415, 417 (2000) ("Allegations of employers' 'excessively
subjective' decisionmaking frequently form the basis of these class actions.")

191.

See infra notes 197-98.

192.
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (granting in part and
denying in part a motion for class certification).
193.
Id. at 149-50.

194.

FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a).

195.
196.

FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b).
See Hart, supra note 189, at 816; Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 46, at 698-705.

197.

See Hart, supra note 189, at 821-25.

198.

Rule 23(a) requires that "there [be] questions of law or fact common to the class." FED. R. CIv.

P. 23(a)(2).
199.

See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
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specific practice that is harming a protected class from the procedural question of whether the plaintiffs have identified common questions of law or
fact. In both, the court is considering whether plaintiffs have identified a
common policy that affected the entire class.2°° Thus, courts have observed
that "at this point the class action and merit inquiries essentially coincide."20'

Not only is the certification question in this context analytically difficult
to separate from the substantive questions posed by the suit, but as a practical matter the class certification decision is often the only judicial decision

in class litigation. The vast majority of employment discrimination class
litigation succeeds or fails at the moment of the certification decision. Studies have indicated that most cases in which a class is certified will settle
without litigating the merits of the claims.20 2 Almost no employment class
litigation has proceeded to trial in the past 15 years.20 3
Given the significance of the certification decision, and the near identity

of the merits questions with the procedural standards for certification, most
discussion of subjective decisionmaking in class litigation has come up in
the context of decisions on class certification. A review of class actions
challenging excessively subjective decisionmaking reveals that courts are
200.
See, e.g., Cook v. Billington, No. 820400, 1988 WL 142376, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1988)
("This subjective decision-making is, according to the plaintiffs, the common thread connecting the
claims of the proposed class members and justifying class certification."); Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d
578, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 191 F.3d 283, 292-93 (2d Cir.
1999) (delegating discretionary authority to supervisors for discipline and promotion constitutes a policy
or practice sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement); Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am.,
Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 355-57 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Neal v. Moore, No. 93-2420, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21339, at *22-*24 (D.D.C. 1994); Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1440, 1446 (W.D.N.C.

1983).
201.
Stasmy v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Ellis v. Elgin
Riverboat Resort, 217 F.R.D. 415, 423 (N.D. fI1. 2003) (reasoning that "the inquiry into whether the
plaintiffs meet the commonality requirement (and to some extent the typicality and adequacy of representation requirements) necessarily overlaps with the merits of the plaintiffs' claim") (citations omitted);
Rowe v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 01-6965, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19561, at *20-*23
(E.D. Pa. 2003); Abram v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 200 F.R.D. 424, 427 (E.D. Wis. 2001);
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 168 (3d Cir. 2001) ("In reviewing
a motion for class certification, a preliminary inquiry into the merits is sometimes necessary to determine
whether the alleged claims can be properly resolved as a class action.") (citation omitted); Wagner v.
Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
202.
See Kramer, supra note 190, at 416 ("Once plaintiffs obtain class certification, the defendant's
exposure, plus projected costs of defending hundreds or thousands of individual claims, places almost
overwhelming and irresistible pressure on the defendant to settle, regardless of the merits of the
An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to
claims.") (citation omitted); see also Thomas E. Willging et al.,
Address the Rulemaking Changes, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 142-44 (1996) (presenting evidence that suggests that many class action settlements occur shortly after or at the time of certification: "certified class
actions were two to five times more likely to settle than cases that contained class allegations but were
never certified. The percentage of certified class actions terminated by a class settlement ranged from
62% to 100%, while settlement rates (including stipulated dismissals) for cases not certified ranged from
20% to 30%."); Bryant G. Garth, Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class Action, 62 IND. L.J. 497,
501-04 (1987) (noting that most class actions settle prior to trial, that certification is the crucial stage for
settlement, and that a decision not to certify "reduces the bargaining power of the plaintiff and the will to

continue the fight").
203.
See Michael W. Hawkins, Current Trends in Class Action Employment Litigation, 19 LAB.
LAw. 33, 56 (2003).
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sharply divided on whether to certify these claims. The divide cannot be
explained by whether the claims are framed as disparate impact or disparate
treatment, nor can it be explained consistently by assessing the evidence
presented in each of the cases. In fact, the split among courts seems less
about the merits of any particular suit than about individual judges' views
about the legitimacy of this type of claim more generally.
1. DisparateImpact Litigation
Disparate impact claims provide a means for plaintiffs to attack an employer's facially neutral policy if the challenged policy has a disproportionate impact on a protected group and cannot be justified as a business necessity.2 As the Supreme Court has explained, "the necessary premise of the
disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted
in operation be functionwithout a deliberately discriminatory motive,20may
5
ally equivalent to intentional discrimination.
Although initially a creation of judicial decision, 206 the current disparate
impact framework is set out in some detail-if not perfect clarity-in Title
VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.207 A plaintiff or plaintiffs
seeking to prove a disparate impact claim must identify a particular employer policy or practice that causes the disparate impact. 208 Having identified the policy or policies to be challenged, the plaintiff must offer statistical
evidence to demonstrate that a protected group is adversely affected by the
application of that policy. 2°9 The defendant may then offer countervailing
statistical analyses of the impact of a particular practice, or may challenge
the statistical evidence offered by the plaintiff. Thus, the bulk of the evidence in a disparate impact case is likely to focus heavily on statistical disparities in the representation of different groups in a particular workplace,
and on competing explanations for these disparities. 210 Even if the plaintiffs
win this statistical battle, and establish that a specific employer practice
does have a significant impact on a protected group, the employer has an
opportunity to "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity." 21' If the
204.

See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988) ("In certain cases,

facially neutral employment practices that have significant adverse effects on protected groups have
been held to violate the Act without proof that the employer adopted those practices with a discriminatory intent.").

205.

Id. at 987.

206.
207.
208.

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433 (1971).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
If an employer's policies are not capable of separation, the employee may focus on the impact of

a combination of policies, but the burden will be on the plaintiff to show that the policies were not capable of separation for analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
209.
See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95 ("Our formulations, which have never been framed in terms of
any rigid mathematical formula, have consistently stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently

substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.").
210.
211.

See id. at987; Griggs,410 U.S. at 432.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000).
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employer makes this showing, the plaintiffs may still win, but only if they
can show an alternative practice that would be as effective for the embusiness purpose, but would have a lesser impact on the
ployer's legitimate
2 2
protected group. 1
In many ways, an employer policy of permitting decentralized, entirely
subjective decisionmaking seems like a perfect candidate for disparate impact analysis. It is a facially neutral policy, and plaintiffs challenging the
policy are likely to point to statistical disparities in the workplace to support
the claim that the policy has had a disproportionate effect on minorities or
women. For some jobs, the employer may be able to justify the use of subjective evaluation criteria as a business necessity. 213 But for others, plaintiffs
may be able to demonstrate that a less subjective process would have a2 14less
negative impact, but would nonetheless serve the employer's purposes.
Perhaps this is why it is in the context of disparate impact litigation that
the Supreme Court has most clearly endorsed claims of excessively subjective decisionmaking. 215 In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,2 16 the Supreme Court held that "committing promotion decisions to the subjective
discretion of supervisory employees" 21 7 can be an employment practice
subject to challenge for its disparate impact on a particular racial group.21 8
The Court tied its reasoning at least in part to the problem of unconscious
discrimination:
Especially in relatively small businesses like respondent's, it may
be customary and quite reasonable simply to delegate employment
decisions to those employees who are most familiar with the jobs to
be filled and with the candidates for those jobs. It does not follow,
however, that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is
delegated always act without discriminatory intent. Furthermore,
even ifone assumed that any such discriminationcan be adequately
policed through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain ....If an em-

212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
213.
As I discuss in Part I.A, courts are careful to recognize the need for subjective criteria in
selecting candidates for professional and supervisory positions and in jobs with significant public interaction.

214. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 1983) (describing a remedial order in which the district court appointed a special master to, among other things,
oversee the creation of objective written criteria for positions that had previously been gender and race
segregated due to channeling and subjective criteria).
See Watson, 487 U.S. at 986-87.
215.
216. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
Id. at 982.
217.
218.
Id. at 991. Prior to that time, the Court's disparate impact jurisprudence had focused on the
effects of objective tests like requiring high school diplomas, standardized testing, and height and weight

requirements. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (focusing on diplomas or
their equivalents); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 428 (1975) (focusing on standardized
tests); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977) (focusing on height and weight requirements).
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ployer's undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has
precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible
intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title 21VIi's
pro9
scription against discriminatory actions should not apply.
Since Watson was decided, however, plaintiffs have rarely pursued suits
alleging exclusively disparate impact discrimination. 220 A number of factors
may explain the relative scarcity of disparate impact suits. The judicially
imposed standards for prevailing in a disparate impact case have become so
onerous that plaintiffs may be making the extremely sensible judgment that
they will be unable to prevail on these claims.2 21 Moreover, the potential
rewards for success in a disparate impact suit are significantly smaller than
for disparate treatment claims. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
increased the damages available to plaintiffs who are successful in disparate
treatment claims by adding compensatory and punitive damages to the
available
relief.222 These added damages are not available for impact
223
claims.
Another possible explanation for the near absence of suits alleging exclusively disparate impact may be that despite Watson's very explicit holding, lower courts have resisted applying impact analysis to claims of excessive subjectivity. A number of courts, appearing to disregard Watson, have
concluded that "[p]laintiffs do not and cannot allege that subjective decision
making itself is a practice that discriminates. Rather, they can only allege
that it allows a situation to exist in which several different managers are
able to discriminate intentionally."2 24 Employing this reasoning, courts have
berated plaintiffs for bringing "disparate treatment claims parading under
the guise of a disparate impact label., 225 Although this hostility towards

219.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-91 (emphasis added).
220.
See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protectionsfor a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 1527 (2002). Kim notes that:
disparate impact cases have become increasingly rare. Employers moved away from using the
objective tests most vulnerable to a disparate impact challenge, while courts made establishing proof of a differential impact more difficult. In recent years, disparate impact suits represented only a small proportion of cases filed under Title VII.
Id.; see also John J. Donohue I & Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNature of Employment Discrimination Litigation,43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 998 n.57 (1991) (estimating that disparate impact cases accounted
for less than 2% of all discrimination suits filed between January 1, 1985 and March 31, 1987).
221.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate impact
Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1487, 1492-96 (1996) (discussing generally
how difficult it is for plaintiffs to succeed with disparate impact claims).
222.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
223.
Id.
224.
Brooks v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. DKC953296, 1996 WL 406684, at *4 (D. Md. 1996),
order vacated by Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Wright v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 526, 541 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Lott v, Westinghouse Savannah River
Co., Inc., 200 F.R.D. 539, 554 (D.S.C. 2000).
225.
Lott, 200 F.R.D. at 553. The court held that
[t]he situation prevailing in a bona fide disparate impact case in which an employment test or
policy, neutral on its face and applicable to all employees, impacts adversely on the protected
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disparate impact challenges to the policies of excessive subjectivity may not
be universal, only one reported case has certified a subjective22decisionmak6
ing class alleging exclusively disparate impact discrimination.
As a result, plaintiffs are more likely to frame their challenges in terms
of disparate treatment where both theories are available, or to argue in the
227
alternative, alleging both disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Whether because of lack of interest on the part of plaintiffs due to obstacles
in proof and limitations on damages, or because of judicial resistance to the

claims, disparate impact litigation has not been a productive approach to
challenging employer policies of excessive subjectivity. 228
2. Disparate Treatment Litigation
Disparate treatment "pattern-or-practice" class suits have shown signifi-

cantly greater potential for success in challenging the kind of employerwide policy of subjective decisionmaking that may permit both conscious
and unconscious discriminatory conduct to survive largely unchecked.
When disparate treatment plaintiffs allege that an employer has discriminated against a class of employees "because of" a prohibited characteristic, they are required to demonstrate that the employer maintained a "pat-

tern or practice" of discrimination, or that discrimination is the "company's
standard operating procedure-the regular rather than the unusual practice., 229 Plaintiffs can meet that burden through statistical evidence demonstrating disparities between the employer's workforce and the available,
relevant labor pool. 230 They can bolster the statistical showing with
anec23
doctal evidence and expert testimony about the employer's policies. '
class is not present here. Another element figures prominently: the intervening conscious decisions of a multitude of diverse managers and supervisors.
Id.
226.
See McClain v. Lufin Indus., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 267, 273 (E.D. Tex. 1999) ("Allocating employment opportunities according to subjective traits can function as a discriminatory employment
practice.").
227.
A number of plaintiff classes have pursued both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.
See. e.g., Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 205 F.R.D. 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2002); Webb v. Merck & Co.,
206 F.R.D. 399, 400-01 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 468 (S.D.
Ohio 2001); Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Ill F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1105 (E.D. Ark. 2000); Smith v.
Texaco, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 663, 669 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Thornton v. Mercantile Stores Co., Inc., 180
F.R.D.437, 438 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C944335SL 1996 WL 421436, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1996); Shores v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., No. 951162CIVT25(E), 1991 WL
407850, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1996); Griffin v. Home Depot, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 187, 189 (E.D. La.
1996); Appleton v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 168 F.R.D. 221, 223-24 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); McKnight v.
Circuit City Stores Inc., No. 395CV964, 1996 WL 454994, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 30, 1996).
228.
In any event, disparate impact is arguably not the appropriate model for handling these claims.
See, e.g., Content of our Categories,supra note 15, at 1231-37 (criticizing the notion of disparate impact
litigation as a suitable tool for challenging unconscious discrimination).
229.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977); see also Bacon, 205 F.R.D.
466,477; Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 1285 (5th Cir. 1994).
230.
See Hazelwood v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) ("[G]ross statistical disparities...
alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie [evidence] of a pattem or practice of discrimination.");
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337; Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 2000) ("In a pattern and practice
disparate treatment case, statistical evidence constitutes the core of a plaintiff's prima facie case.");
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After the plaintiffs make out a prima facie case that the employer's
policies constitute a pattern or practice of discrimination, the employer can
respond by challenging the statistical proof offered, or by suggesting other
explanations for the apparent statistical anomaly. 2 If the defendant is not
successful in rebutting the plaintiffs' prima facie case, the class of plaintiffs
has won the liability portion of the litigation. At this point, a court may order injunctive or other class-wide relief, but the question of damages to any
individual plaintiff remains to be resolved.233 The plaintiffs' victory at the
liability phase establishes a presumption that each individual employment
decision was the product of the employer's discriminatory practices, but the
employer can overcome that presumption in a particular case by demonstrating that the employment action taken against that employee was not
discriminatory.234
There is considerable debate among lower courts as to the legitimacy of
applying this pattern-or-practice framework to claims alleging excessively
subjective decisionmaking. The Supreme Court has never faced the issue
head-on, but a footnote in the Court's 1982 decision in General Telephone
Co. v. Falcon provided the minimal text whose interpretation fuels the debate. 235 In Falcon, the Court confronted the appropriateness of so-called
"across-the-board" class actions, in which a group of plaintiffs challenged
all of an employer's practices-hiring, promotion, firing, etcetera-as discriminatory. 236 The Court rejected the across-the-board class action employment claim, holding that a representative plaintiff who claimed he had
been discriminatorily passed over for promotion could not represent a class
of plaintiffs who had not been hired, because failing to promote is a distinct
practice from refusing to hire.237 However, in doing so, the majority noted
that the employer might face a suit by a class of employees whose claims
were addressed to a variety of different practices if the plaintiffs could demonstrate a general policy of discrimination that operated in the same manner
with regard to the full range of employment practices being challenged.238
For example, the Court specifically noted, that plaintiffs might allege that an

Forehand v. Fla. State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1574-75 (11th Cir. 1996).
231.
Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., No. C881467MHP, 1991 WL 127073, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4,
1991) ("[W]here statistics alone do not establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment [in a class
action suit], direct and anecdotal evidence of intentional discrimination must be strong."); see also Butler
v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257, 1260-61 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824
F. Supp. 847, 863 (D. Minn. 1993); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1985).
232.
See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308-09; Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147,
161 (2d Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1285-86 (N.D. 111.
1986), affd,
839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
233.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361-62.
234.
See id.; Shuford v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 968 F. Supp. 1486, 1506 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Harrison
v. Lewis, 559 F. Supp. 943, 946-47 (D.D.C. 1983).
235.
Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
236.
Id. at 156-57.
237.
Id. at157.
238.
Id. at 159 n.15.
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employer had a "general policy" of employing "entirely subjective decisionmaking processes. ,,239
In the years since Falcon was decided, numerous courts have recognized the kind of claim hinted at in footnote 15, where the common thread
that makes class litigation appropriate is an employer's policy of delegating
decisionmaking authority so complete!) that the process constitutes "subjective, standardless decision-making., 24' To be successful in pressing these

claims, plaintiffs generally need two things: a system of decisionmaking
that is "entirely subjective" or that allows "standardless subjective decisions,,2 4 1 and persuasive statistical evidence suggesting that minorities are
treated less well than whites (or women than men) in the particular workplace. 242 In a fairly typical class action suit alleging a pattern-or-practice of

excessively subjective decisionmaking, a group of female employees sued
Home Depot on behalf of all female employees in the home improvement
store's West Coast Division. 243 The plaintiffs in Butler v. Home Depot, Inc.
alleged that the defendant operated an "entirely subjective" system for "hiring, job assignment, training, promotions, and compensation," that there
were no objective criteria for hiring or for setting pay, and that "local gender biased male managers [were] therefore left broad discretion to make

decisions that [had] an adverse effect upon women."

4

To bolster these

allegations, the plaintiffs offered statistical evidence demonstrating that
Home Depot's workforce was highly gender-segregated and anecdotal evidence of individual instances of discrimination.2 45 The Butler class was cer-

239.
Id.
240.
Boykin v. Georgia Pac., 706 F.2d 1384, 1390 (5th Cir. 1983); see also In re Pepco Employment
Litig., No. 860603(RCL), 1992 WL 442759, at *12 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 1992) ("The subjectivity that infects
PEPCO's hiring
process is another fact common to all applicant claims."); id. at *20 (noting that the
plaintiffs' statistical studies "when combined with plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence and evidence of subjective decision-making prove that a discriminatory promotion and transfer claim is common to plaintiffs'
proposed subclass"); Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc.,
673 F2d 798, 815-18 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that
reliance on recommendations of supervisors in promotion decisionmaking has a discriminatory effect);
Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 546 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing "that promotion
systems utilizing subjective evaluations by all white supervisors provide a ready mechanism for discrimination").
241.
See Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1487 (11 th Cir. 1987) ("We caution, however, that although district courts should give real meaning to Falcon'sfootnote fifteen, that footnote should not be
used to defeat the general dictates of Falcon."); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038, 1053 (5th Cir.
1984) (discussing a "standardless subjective system"); Bacon v. Honda of Am., 205 F.R.D. 466, 476
(M.D. Ohio 2001) (declining to apply footnote 15 because the employer based its decisions in some part
on objective criteria); Vinson v. Seven Seventeen 1ib Philadelphia Corp., No. 006334, 2001 WL
1774073, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2001) ("In applying Footnote 15, lower courts have demanded that
plaintiffs show that a defendant's decision making process is entirely subjective before permitting an
across-the-board attack."); Wynn v. Dixieland Food Stores, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 696, 701 (M.D. Ala. 1989)
(stating that footnote 15 applies only where the defendants used one entirely subjective selection system,
employing the same selection process regardless of the type or level of job filled).
242.
See, e.g., Page, 726 F.2d at 1047-48.
243.
Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C9444335SI, 1996 WL 421436, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25,
1996).
244.
Id.
245.
Id. at *1-*2.
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tified and ultimately settled.246 In the past two decades, at least twenty cases
have been certified on this theory.247

But, while many courts have accepted these pattern-or-practice claims,

more have not.2 48 Indeed, in the disparate treatment context, as in disparate
impact suits, some courts are extremely hostile to the entire notion of "entirely subjective decision-making" as an employment practice. 249 As one
court has explained it, "what we have here are evaluations and decisions

made by hundreds of supervisors and managers on a variety of things besides promotions, such as job assignments, salary determinations, merit
increases, etc. From a practice standpoint, it is impossible to put these all
under one roof., 250 Other courts have expressed the fear that an employer
246.
See id. at *1;Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 46, at 684-85; Sturm, supra note 49, at
509-19.
247.
See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 191 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1999); Rossini v.
Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 593-94 (2d Cir. 1986) (reversing decertification); Shipes v. Trinity
Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 324 (5th Cir. 1993); McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 208 F.R.D.
428, 440 (D.D.C. 2002); Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 205 F.R.D. 43, 45-47
(D.D.C. 2002); Beck v. Boeing Co., 203 F.R.D 459, 462-68 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Drayton v. W. Auto
Supply Co., 203 F.R.D. 520, 528-29 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp.
2d 1101, 1130 (E.D. Ark. 2000); McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 267, 272-74 (E.D. Tex.
1999); Shores v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., No. 951162CIVT25(E), 1996 WL 407850, at *5-*7 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 12, 1996); Butler, 1996 WL 421436, at *1-*7; McKnight v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No.
395CV964, 1996 WL 454994, at *3-*5 (E.D. Va. Apr. 30, 1996); Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am.,
Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 354-57 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Griffin v. Home Depot, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 187, 189-91
(E.D. La. 1996); In re Pepco Employment Litig.,
1992 WL 442759, at *1; Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite
Co., 139 F.R.D. 657, 660-62 (D. Minn. 1991); Cook v. Billington, No. 820400, 1988 WL 142376, at *4*5 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1988); Warren v. Xerox Corp., No. 01CV2909(JG), 2004 WL 1562884, at *2, *8*10(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004).
248.
See, e.g., Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 580 (6th Cir. 2004); Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1998); Page, 726 F.2d at1056; Thompson v. Merck &
Co., Inc., No. CA01 1004, 2004 WL 62710, at *3-*5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2004); Ellis v. Elgin Riverboat
Resort, 217 F.R.D. 415, 428-30 (N.D. I11.
2003); Robertson v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d
33, 42-43 (D. Conn. 2003); Webb v. Merck & Co, 206 F.R.D. 399, 401-02 (E.D. Penn. 2002); Vance v.
City of Nacogdoches, 198 F. Supp. 2d 858, 859-61 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 187 F.
Supp. 2d 462, 468-69 (D. Md. 2002); Claybome v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 211 F.R.D. 573, 599-601
(D. Neb. 2002); Reap v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 199 F.R.D. 536, 544-46 (D.N.J. 2001); Vinson, 2001 WL
1774073, at *21-*22; Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 638, 643-45 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Cooper v. S. Co., 205 F.R.D. 596, 610-27 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Adams v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, No.
98C4025, 2001 WL 336830, at *21-*22 (N.D. 111.Apr. 6, 2001); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 201
F.R.D. 526, 539-42 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Riley v. Compucom Systems, Inc., No. 398CV1876L, 2000 WL
343189, at *3-*5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2000); Hively v. Northlake Foods, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 661, 666-67
(M.D. Fla. 2000); Allen v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 99C7614, 2000 WL 1207408, at *9- 10 (N.D. Ill.
Jul. 31, 2000); Faulk v. Home Oil Co., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 645, 655-69 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (cert. denied on
Allison grounds); Abram v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 200 F.R.D.424, 428-33 (E.D. Wis. 2001);
Appleton v. Deloite & Touche, L.L.P., 168 F.R.D. 221, 229-33 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); Brooks v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., No. DKC953296, 1996 WL 406684, at *5-*6 (D. Md. Jun. 17, 1996); Hartman v.
Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
249.
See Targeting Workplace Context, supra note 46, at 690-98 (discussing examples of judicial
resistance to finding commonality in class suits challenging subjective decisionmaking).
250.
Robertson v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No. 397CVI216(GLG), 2000 WL 33381019, at *5-*6 (D.
Conn. July 25, 2001); see also Brooks, 1996 WL 406684, at *1, rev'd in part on other grounds, 148 F.3d
373 (4th Cir. 1998)); Wright, 201 F.R.D. at 541 ("[Tlhe purported class is comprised of a large group of
diverse and differently situated employees whose highly individualized claims of discrimination do not
lend themselves to class-wide proof."); Lott v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 200 F.R.D. 539, 55354 (D.S.C. 2000); Abram, 200 F.R.D. at 433; Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D.
230, 239 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
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would be subject to a pattern-or-practice suit whenever it gave supervisors
discretion to make decisions.25 '
This judicial resistance to class claims challenging excessively subjective decisionmaking policies that infect an employer's entire corporate operation is unwarranted. Obviously, not every class alleging that an employer
allows largely unfettered discretion to its decisionmaking supervisors
should be certified. Courts reasonably require some level of credible evidence suggesting a broadly applicable discriminatory practice in order to
allow these cases to proceed under Rule 23. But, as with individual claims
of excessive subjectivity, the issue is one of proof in the particular case, not
the viability of the claim in the abstract. When a class of plaintiffs can support its allegations with specific evidence that an employer has a centralized
and widely applicable policy of allowing supervisors to exercise entirely
subjective judgment in hiring, firing, promotions, and other decisions on the
job, as well as statistical evidence demonstrating that decisions made across
the workplace are excluding minorities and women or are relegating them to
lower paying, lower status positions, Title VII requires some evaluation of
why this is happening. Rule 23 permits that evaluation on a class-wide
scale. Indeed, class suits may be particularly important and appropriate to
challenge employee claims of excessive subjectivity in an employer's decisionmaking processes. When an employer permits largely uncabined discretion to its supervisors, the risk of the pervasive operation of unconscious
biases and stereotypes in decisionmaking is considerable. While any particular plaintiff may lack sufficient proof to mount a successful challenge to
a specific decision or series of decisions, evaluation of those individual decisions in the aggregate may reveal a pattern that could thrive unchecked
without the class action device. When an employer is, or should be, aware
of the demonstrable consequences of permitting individual supervisors unguided independence in employment decisionmaking, its decision to continue that unguided independence is a company policy that should be subject to challenge, like any other employer policy or practice whose consequence is the denial of equal opportunities.
CONCLUSION

The strong judicial resistance to the very notion that there could be illegal discrimination in a system-wide practice of permitting excessively subjective decisionmaking is just one of many instances in Title VII litigation
where the biggest obstacle plaintiffs face may not be the law, but the court.
The application of a strong requirement that a plaintiff must prove employer
See, e.g., Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1346, 1363 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating
251.
that "a decision by a company to give managers the discretion to make employment decisions, and the

subsequent exercise of that discretion by some managers in a discriminatory manner, is not tantamount
to a decision by a company to pursue a systemic, companywide policy of intentional discrimination");
Webb v. Merck & Co., 206 F.R.D. 399 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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dishonesty in order to prevail on a claim of individual disparate treatment is
another, and the grafting of a direct evidence requirement onto the mixed
motive provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is a third. In each of these
instances, the doctrine does not require the harsh standards that courts have
applied. Unfortunately, as these examples suggest, Title VII is often applied

by judges252 in a stingy and, as Michael Zimmer describes it, "unsympathetic"
manner.

Legal realists have long recognized that the outcome of a case will depend as much on the attitudes of the decisionmakers as on the substance of
the law applicable to the case.253 One of the particularly difficult issues with
allegations of employment discrimination is that one's view of what "actu-

ally happened" in a situation will be shaped substantially by one's background convictions and experiences.254 Unfortunately, research shows a
dramatic gap in perceptions of racial equality between black and white
Americans.255 Many studies in recent years demonstrate that "blacks and
whites disagree about whether or not racial discrimination persists, to what
extent, and to what effect." 256 Indeed, "despite the compelling evidence of
contemporary racial disparities, between 40% to 60% of Whites responding
to a recent survey ... viewed the average Black in the United States as faring about as well, and often better, than the average White. 257
Judges are human, and thus are just as susceptible to these perceptual
gaps as the rest of us. 258 Regardless of what claims Title VII may support,
252.
Michael Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 CoLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REV. 575, 576 (2003).
253.
See, e.g., Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645 (1932); Karl Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLum. L. REV. 431 (1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929);
Max Radin, The Theory of JudicialDecision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357 (1925).
254.
See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination:A Matter of Perspective Rather Than Intent, 34
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 675 (2003) ("Those who see discrimination as a pervasive and unjust
aspect of our society are far more likely to interpret ambiguous events as the product of discrimination,
while those who believe, or want to believe, that discrimination has receded in importance will attribute
observed inequalities to forces other than discrimination.").
255.
A 2002 study, for example, found that black employees are five times more likely than their
white co-workers to believe that African-Americans are the most likely targets of discrimination. John J.
Heldrich Center For Workforee Dev., A Workplace Divided: How Americans View Discrimination and
Race on the Job, at http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/Resources/Publication/19/WorkTrends_020107.pd
f (Jan. 2002). And, while only about one-half of black employees believe that employment practices
such as hiring, salaries, and promotion are fair to all employees, 94% of white employees believe that
such practices are uniformly applied. Id. See also Joseph Lelyveld, How RACE IS LIVED IN AMERICA:
PULLING TOGETHER, PULLING APART 385 (2002) (reporting that 73% of white Americans believe that
blacks are not treated unfairly in the workplace; only 40% of blacks agreed); The Washington
Post/Kaiser Family FoundationlHarvard University, Race and Ethnicity in 2001: Attitudes, Perceptions
and Experiences,available at http://www.kkf.org/kaiserpolls/3143-index.cfm (Sept. 27, 2001).
256.
Selmi, supra note 254, at 663 (quoting Claire Jean Kim, Managing the Racial Breach: Clinton,
Black-White Polarization,and the Race Initiative, 117 POL. SC. Q. 55, 58 (2002)).
257.
Dovidio et al., supra note 27, at 88-89 (citations omitted); see also Davis, supra note 61 (describing differing perceptions of racial inequalities in the legal system).
258.
See, e.g., Vicki Schultz & Stephen Patterson, Race, Gender, Work and Choice: An Empirical
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
1073, 1167 (1992) ("There is little disagreement that judges' political, social, and personal values may
affect their decisions."); Judge Howard T. Hogan, Some Thoughts on Juries in Civil Cases, 50 A.B.A. J.
752, 753 (1964) ("Our judgment of issues of facts must always be based in part upon what we, as indi-
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some judges will be unlikely to see bias in an interaction that did not involve a direct, explicit statement of discriminatory intent. 59 Others will be
more likely to look at an interaction in which subjective value judgments
played a central role and to suspect that culturally embedded stereotyping
infected those judgments. 2"0 Unfortunately for Title VII plaintiffs, the hos-

tility of the federal judiciary to employment discrimination claims has been
widely recognized.

261

Just as employers should be conscious of the ways in

which their background prejudices affect workplace decisions, so should
judges evaluating evidence in a discrimination case take special care that
their unconscious assumptions and biases do not become a motivating factor
in their decisions.
Employment discrimination plaintiffs face considerable hurdles when

they mount challenges to biased workplace decisions. Sociological and psychological research suggests that many challenges may be particularly difficult because discriminatory attitudes are even more likely to play a role
when a decisionmaker can justify her decision with a non-discriminatory
explanation. A plaintiff may, as a result, have considerable trouble catching
her employer in a "lie" about the reasons for an employment decision, but
viduals, are-the sum total of our experiences, our backgrounds, our prejudices and our limitations.").
259.
Chad Derum and Karen Engle have argued that Title VII has become less effective as applied
because of shifts in the background assumptions made by judges. See Chad Denim & Karen Engle, The
Rise of the PersonalAnimosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to "No Cause" Employment, 81
TEx. L. REV. 1177, 1196 (2003). In the early years of the statute's application, courts tended to operate
on the assumption that if an employment decision was unexplained, or the explanation made no sense or
lacked support, it was likely that the decision involved discrimination. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). That assumption has shifted, and many judges today instead presume
that the employer who is unwilling or unable to explain a decision may have acted with personal animosity-which is not prohibited by law-rather than discriminatory animus. An interesting aspect of this
shift is the assumption that personal animosity and racism are distinct problems. Of course, while this is
sometimes true, itis also the case that racism-whether conscious or unconscious-can lead to personal
animosity. See Derum & Engle, supra, at 1179; see also Selmi, supra note 254, at 668 ("[1]t is not the
doctrine that has led to conservative judicial interpretations, but instead, that doctrine is the product of a
limited vision of the decision makers on matters of discrimination, whether those decision makers are
judges or jurors."); Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of CircumstantialProofin Employment Discrimination
Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality" Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L 183, 186 (1997) ("[T]he Court's ready acceptance of a 'personality clash' as a nondiscriminatory justification ignores the effects of unconscious bias and stereotyping and opens a gaping
loophole in the law."); Schultz & Petterson, supra note 258, at 1180 ("After a decade of efforts to enforce Title VII, federal judges apparently began to share the general public's belief that employment
discrimination against minorities had been largely eradicated.").
260.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
See Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext
261.
Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539, 544-46 (2001) ("[C]ourts will exploit any loopholes provided by theSupreme Court to dismiss what they consider to be unmeritorious discrimination suits."); Ann C.
McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in
Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 210 (1993); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (2001) (showing the lower courts'
hostility to employment discrimination cases; in particular noting that plaintiffs are "half as successful
when their cases are tried before a judge than a jury, and success rates are more than fifty percent below
the rate of other claims"); Leland Ware, Inferring Intentfrom Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary
Judgment Confusion in Employment DiscriminationCases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 EMPLOYEE
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 37, 63 (2000) (noting "the reluctance and doubt that greet claims asserted by civil
rights plaintiffs"); Shultz & Petterson, supra note 258, at 1151-52 (describing the shift in judicial attitudes about the significance of plaintiffs' proof after a decade of Title VI enforcement).
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this should not prevent the plaintiff from surviving summary judgment. The
judicially imposed requirement of employer dishonesty-with its attendant
focus on the consciously intentional nature of prohibited discriminationwas never an element of Title VII, and it should be abandoned. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, together with the decision in Desert Palace v. Costa,
opens up a real opportunity for courts to recognize the complex nature of
discrimination-not as either-or, but as part of a decisionmaking process
likely to have multiple motivating factors, some of which will be conscious,
but many of which the decisionmaker will not truly be aware. Challenges to
an employer's excessively subjective decisionmaking processes, which are
increasingly common in both individual and class litigation, reveal the practical impossibility of distinguishing conscious from unconscious discrimination and offer real potential for addressing some of the most pervasive and
presistent modem discrimination.

